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Abstract 
 
 
The European Union’s growing range of competences increases the degree of required 
societal support among the member states’ citizens. This study intends to ‘map’ national 
attitudes towards the EU and to deduct their political implications. Therefore, the concepts of  
i) identification with the EU and ii) support of the EU are combined within a matrix of four 
ideal types. 
Individuals are assigned to these four ideal types: the ‘EU-Enthusiasts’, the ‘EU-Pragmatics’, 
the ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’, and the ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’. I claim that the 
population share of the two ‘mixed’ ideal types - mostly neglected in the literature – provide 
essential insight into national attitude towards the EU: ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ identify 
themselves as citizens of the EU but are critical towards its politics; on the other hand,  
‘EU-Pragmatics’ support the EU’s politics but do not identify with its institutions or its 
community.  
The study’s main finding is the enormous country-specific variation of i) the populations’ ide-
al type shares and ii) correlations between identification with and support of the EU (Euroba-
rometer 77.3, May 2012). Another crucial result is the (partial) rejection of the explanatory 
macro variable ‘duration of EU membership’. Beyond this, the geographic split-up seems 
inappropriate: the often assumed idea of pragmatic ‘Eastern’ and idealistic ‘Western’ countries 
cannot be affirmed, which calls for a change of mind with respect to ‘East-West’ and ‘old-
new’ prejudices in this scientific field.  
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European identity grows out of our deepening cooperation […].  
More Europe means making diversity more genuinely part of our lives and allowing it to unite us. 
Joachim Gauck, Federal President of Germany.  
Speech on “Prospects of the European Idea”, 2013 
 
1 Introduction 
 
After a number of decades, it has become evident that the economic integration of the Euro-
pean Union (hereinafter ‘EU’) and its strengthened appearance in everyday life has neither 
increased the citizens’ identification with the EU nor support for it1. This is a worrying cir-
cumstance – especially since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, which highlighted 
the growing range of competences assigned to the EU. This widened policy scope calls for a 
stronger citizens’ commitment to the EU - assuming that a continued Europeanisation is pref-
erable with regard to global politics and economic interweaving2.  
Klaus-Dieter Lehmann states that Europe is neither a ‘melting pot’ nor a ‘salad bowl’ but a 
mosaic – the question is what adhesive forces keep it together (Lehmann 2012)? Many schol-
ars regard identification with the EU and the European community3 as a crucial adhesive 
which is said to lead directly to support for the EU (hereinafter ‘EU-identification’ and ‘EU-
support’4). But to date, the assumption that EU-identification straightly brings EU-support has 
not been verified. However, a marked finding is that the relationship between both concepts is 
country-specific (see ch. 2). This context provides the background to this work’s research de-
sign (see ch. 1.2). 
National ‘visions’ of and expectations towards the EU diverge enormously5. This leads to the 
decisive question of how to strengthen EU-identification and EU-support among culturally 
and economically unequal member states? What ‘kind’ of ‘identity promotion’ is promising in 
a given country?  In order to give political implications with regard to this question, this work 
attempts to ‘map’ national attitudes towards the EU.  
 
                                                 
1 Roose (2010a, pp 137 f.); Fligstein (2008, p 142) 
2 This field of research inherently features normative overtones. Nevertheless, Europeanization is assumed as 
favourable process. General discussion on desirability of European integration is not elaborated in this study. 
3 Definition of the terms ‘identity’ and ‘identification’ are discussed in chapter 4.2 
4 In order to facilitate reading, I introduce additional abbreviations in the following (i.e. ‘EU-support’, ‘EU-
attitude’, and ‘EU-framing’). It is noteworthy that these introduced terms do not refer to the EU as subject of 
action.  These terms describe the EU as target object of the citizens’ identification/support/attitude/framing 
processes.  
5 e.g. Kriesi (1999, pp 272 ff.) 
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1.1 Relevance  
 
One might argue that this scientific field indicates normative overtones. This criticism cannot 
easily be denied. After all, voices claim the European ‘project’ as redundant and are in favour 
of rejecting it as a whole. However, the following three arguments emphasize the new chal-
lenges of the EU and the derived relevance of the citizens’ attitude towards it (hereinafter 
‘EU-attitude’). 
The times of the EU being a mere ‘top-down’ institution6 seem to be over: the EU is acquiring 
a citizens’ interest. It is embedded in a reciprocal environment that features intensified ‘bot-
tom-up’ processes – for example by democratisation7, appearances in the media, strengthened 
European civil society, and broadening political competencies8. This new situation requires a 
changing quality of transnational legitimacy.  
Secondly, critical junctures are a severe issue endangering the EU’s stability. The latest criti-
cal event is the financial crisis that broke out in 2007. The consequences put the member 
states’ solidarity to the test – the future of ‘failed’ member states is still uncertain today and 
some countries are not willing to provide the needed assistance. European citizens might 
withdraw their support as soon as the EU does not provide the expected benefits or costs are 
anticipated. This points to a lack of stability and deeply-rooted commitment towards the EU 
(hereinafter ‘EU-commitment’). Only in few member states does this kind of commitment 
seem to be prevalent9.   
The third challenge the EU faces is world politics. Among powerful global players, such as 
the United States and China, it is favourable for the EU’s power position to speak with one 
voice. Despite the impossibility that all Europeans could have the same opinion on one issue, 
the crucial precondition seems to be an agreed-upon legitimised democratic structure of the 
EU. Most importantly, the citizens’ feeling of ‘belonging together’ makes this legitimate polit-
ical ‘mouthpiece’ reality. 
Consequently, conducting research on EU-identification and EU-support seems crucial for the 
                                                 
6 When it comes to the EU as institution, this term describes the EU’s role as political institution incorporating its 
structures, procedures and rules (Hillmann 2007, p 381 f.). 
In the literature, the definition varies enormously depending on the discipline (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p 1). 
Chapter 3.1 shows detailed aspects of this term.  
Usually, a very broad definition is used throughout this work: institutions are social “formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating procedures that structure the relationships between people” (Hall 1986, p 7). 
These rules can emerge consciously and unconsciously as a result of culture and sense-giving.  
7 But although mentioned democratisation processes have been carefully initiated, it is arguable whether the 
population feels represented by the powerful and centralized EU executive. 
8 Beck (2012) 
9 Brost & Schiertz (2012); Habermas (2013) 
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EU’s new challenges. But only a little research on country-specific EU-attitude has yet been 
published. This study aims to take first steps into this area combining the concepts of EU-
identification and EU-support. The next section clarifies this research attempt in a brief sum-
mary. 
 
1.2 Research attempt  
 
This section contains the basic concept behind the present work intends to ‘map’ national EU-
attitude. Due to the early stage of presentation, many aspects of the research design are antici-
pated without detailed theoretical derivation (cf. ch. 3 and 4.2). Nevertheless, this overview is 
expected to facilitate intelligibility of the following chapters.  
First of all, it is assumed that national institutions have a crucial effect on EU-attitude. For 
instance, political and social institutions create a unique context in which citizens form their 
individual attitude (see ch. 2.1 and 3). Throughout this work, institutions are, if not declared 
as political institution, used in a broader sense: institutions are social rules that structure rela-
tionships (Hall 1986, p 7). These rules can emerge consciously and unconsciously as a result 
of culture and sense-giving (Hillmann 2007: 381).  
This study’s innovative idea10 is the combination of high/low EU-identification and high/low 
EU-support. These two concepts are of equal value, independent from each other and exhibit 
weak mutual influence. Consequently, a matrix of high/low EU-identification and high/low 
EU-support can be established (see table 1 in ch. 4.2). The matrix contains four fields that 
correspond to the four ideal types11 i) ‘EU-Enthusiasts’, ii) ‘EU-Pragmatics’, iii) ‘sceptical 
EU-Idealists’, and iv) ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’12. 
This work stands in opposition to ‘mainstream’ assumptions which presume that EU-
identification works as a sufficient (and partly necessary) condition for EU-support13. Two 
‘mainstream’ ideal types are predominant in literature: ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ and ‘EU-Opponents’. 
Two almost neglected ideal types are shown in the ‘mixed’ cells: ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ and 
                                                 
10 As far as the author knows there has not yet been published a comparable research design. 
11 According to Max Weber’s definition of ideal types (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 353; Weber 1984c, pp 19 ff.) 
12 Respondents might rate low due to either rejection of the EU or indifference towards it; therefore, this ideal 
type is split in EU-Opponents and EU-Non-affected. 
13 “There is the normative suggestion that the creation of European identity will lead to increased public support 
for integration” (Carey 2002, p 390). Confer also Mau (2005); Fuchs & Klingemann (2011); Christin (2008); 
Lucarelli (2011); Easton (1965). 
Certainly, there are scholars who perceive this relationship as rather loose, e.g. Thomas Meyer who argues that 
“high scores in ‘European identity’ can go very well together” with the rejection of EU integration (Meyer in 
Bain & Holland 2007, p 30). 
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‘EU-Pragmatics’. The crucial idea behind these two patterns is that there are individuals who 
do identify themselves as citizens of the EU but are critical towards its politics, i.e. the ‘scep-
tical EU-Idealists’. On the other hand, individuals who support these politics but do not iden-
tify with its institutions or the community are ‘EU-Pragmatics’ (detailed explanation see ch. 
4.2).  
This perspective is usually not applied to empirical research and, consequently, the four intro-
duced ideal types have not yet been analysed. I claim that these ‘mixed’ individual patterns 
provide essential insight into national EU-attitude. Summing up, the research question is the 
following: 
 
What pattern of country-specific EU-attitude do the member states’ populations 
feature? This characteristic EU-attitude is reflected by the combination of 
high/low EU-identification and EU-support which results in distinct, national 
shares, of the four ideal types ‘EU-Enthusiasts’, ‘EU-Pragmatics’, ‘sceptical EU-
Idealists’, and ‘EU-Non-affected’/’EU-Opponents’. 
 
The attempt of this work is to find out, how a predetermined, dualistic framing of the EU in-
fluences the national attitude towards the EU (see ch. 3.2.2)14. This study applies a rational 
and an emotional dimension which refer to two societal spheres including different target 
objects and modes of psychological retrieval (see ch.2.1 and 3.2). 
Furthermore, three explanatory approaches are presented and evaluated. The respective varia-
bles are based on national contexts15: national value orientation, the evaluation of national 
institutions (referring to the political opportunity cost model; cf. ch. 3.3.2), and the emergence 
probability of EU-identification due to the prevalent national identity type (see ch. 3.3)16. The 
presented results are limited to descriptive results based on aggregated micro data (Euroba-
rometer 77.3). Nevertheless, they provide political implications as to how EU-commitment 
can be strengthened considering the country-specific EU-attitude. Above this, the work at-
tempts to contribute to measurement systematisation and the development of theoretical con-
cepts on EU-identification and EU-support. 
                                                 
14 Boomgaarden et al. (2011, p 243); Lucarelli (2011) 
15 With regard to the characteristic context within each nation-state, this work’s theoretical fundament is 
institutionalism (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 382): national institutions are therefore the decisive factor for the 
emergence of transnational identification and support. Besides institutionalism, also other relevant theoretical 
perspectives will be introduced as social constructionism and symbolic interactionism (see ch. 3). 
16 Due to the novelty and extent of this research attempt, the causality between micro and macro level cannot be 
examined. 
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In order to fulfil these attempts, the study’s structure is as follows. General limitations are 
shown hereinafter. Chapter 2 presents relevant literature and derives shortcomings of this sci-
entific field including this work’s point of contact. Afterwards, chapter 3 introduces the main 
theoretical perspectives and assumptions of this study and describes three theoretical explana-
tory approaches. The detailed research design is found in chapter 4 including methodological 
positioning and operationalisation. Chapter 5 shows the results of ideal-typical EU-attitudes, 
presenting a country clustering and the evaluation of explanatory variables. The final chapter 
comprises suggestions for further research, political implications, and an outlook on the new 
challenges of European integration. 
 
1.3 General limitations 
 
The present work contains general limitations that require clarification in advance. Firstly, 
comparative research can be misleading, resulting in ad hoc explanations. This proves prob-
lematic because such explanations can hardly be confirmed due to the subject’s high complex-
ity17. Relevant influence factors are almost impossible to analyse simultaneously, such as pub-
lic media, institutional checks and balances, the influence of world politics, and also 
individual attributes and psychological dispositions.  
The reader shall also be aware that the following problems arise due to an ‘international’ 
questionnaire: the measurement instruments can be critizised since translations cannot master 
various cultural cleavages. This includes national answering strategies and culturally biased 
text apprehension. Also, the items provided in relevant datasets cannot fulfil the requirements 
of the theoretical model (cf. ch. 4.2 and 4.3). Furthermore, complexity and abstract nature of 
the constructs ‘identification’ and ‘support’ impede measurability; consequently, literature 
shows no agreed upon basic definitions and concepts which hampers the development of this 
research field (cf. ch. 2.2). 
The question arises what the unit of analysis actually is: is it the EU, the member state, or the 
citizen? Besides the EU as target object of the citizens’ EU-attitude, there are also ‘Europeans’ 
and ‘Europe’ - in terms of history, culture, and bilateral trust – and these are meaningful alter-
native target objects of commitment. Leaving this variety of options behind and turning to this 
study’s defined target object of citizens’ attitude, namely the EU, it is arguable as to whether it 
                                                 
17 Fuchs presents a model of mass opinion that shows the complexity of this issue on system and individual level 
(Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 44). 
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is composed of political institutions, national or transnational political actors, citizens, emer-
gent abstract values, narratives, and principles – or all of the above.  
Rautenfeld argues that European identity is “marked by emptiness rather than specific con-
tent”; hence, individuals have room to fill it “as they best see fit” (Rautenfeld 2011, p 235). It 
is likely that every citizen ‘frames’ the EU differently in numerous dimensions; the identifica-
tion of a nation-specific EU-attitude is highly questionable against this backdrop (cf. ch. 
3.2.1, 4.2). This issue challenges this research design fundamentally. 
Some scholars argue that identification with the EU is not necessary for a running political 
system. Referring to Habermas, only a common “civic culture” is needed18. This general sug-
gestion also strains this work’s research design.  
 
 
2 Previous research 
 
In chapter 2.1, a brief overview of the research landscape is presented. Three sections show 
relevant literature whose structure is oriented towards this work’s basic research decisions. A 
short summary is given at the end of each section. Chapter 2.2 demonstrates the shortcomings 
of the research field and this study’s points of contact.  
 
2.1 Overview of relevant research and prevailing approaches  
 
Presenting the whole literature of this scientific realm goes beyond the scope of this work. 
Therefore, I focus on empirical studies that compare country-specific attitudes towards the EU 
and Europe. Various theoretical approaches, methods, and explanatory variables are applied to 
analyse attitudes towards Europe in this research landscape19. Overall, the research landscape 
is very difficult to structure due to various approaches and little consensus on basic concepts. 
Studies differ in several classification spheres, be it the theoretical approach, basic definitions, 
unit of analysis, or methodology. Nevertheless, the following paragraphs attempt to show a 
brief overview of differentiation criteria. 
                                                 
18 The “civic culture” assumes that shared civic principles are the main precondition for a running (transnational) 
political system; Almond & Sidney Verba (1989); Donig, Meyer & Winkler (2005, p 133); Fuchs & Klingemann 
(2011); Habermas (2008). 
19Only few studies investigate EU-identification and EU-support. I, thus, present studies analysing related 
concepts and target objects. For instance, there is much literature on ‘identity’ and ‘trust’ as related concepts and 
‘Europe’ or ‘Europeans’ as related target objects. 
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The ‘quest’ for adequate concepts of European identity and its support is in progress and 
ranges from essentialist, through rational-choice and constructivist to neo-institutionalist per-
spectives (cf. Fan 2008). Many sociological studies are based on institutionalist and construc-
tivist assumptions in order to find nation-specific and/or individual characteristics that affect 
attitudes towards the EU. Independently of this theoretical backdrop, the main distinction 
seems to be a – seemingly unconscious - content-wise focus: studies mostly refer to an i) eco-
nomic, a political, or a social/cultural/community-based point of view.  
Also, scholars’ theorisation and operationalisation of the attitude towards the EU is mostly 
described within a continuum. It mostly ranges from ii) affectual to rational. Another differ-
entiation is whether the analyses interpret iii) concrete behaviour and attitudes or latent val-
ues and beliefs. Studies are generally conducted on iv) macro or micro level, and partly in-
clude a multilevel design. With regard to the emergence of EU-attitude, the assumed causality 
direction is either v) bottom-up which reflects the civil society’s influence or institutional top-
down hypotheses which are currently prevailing. 
So far, research has focused on specific support of the EU rather than on identification with it. 
The decision to analyse specific support is surely in favour of less abstractness and the easier-
to-measure construct. As aforementioned, EU-support is often assumed to be the immediate 
result of EU-identity. Several scholars and preinvestigations of the present work have revealed 
that this link is not that clear20. In literature, European identity and support serve as both vi) 
independent or dependent variables. European identity is often ‘only’ one explanatory varia-
ble amongst many. As previously mentioned, most scholars assume that EU-support is unidi-
rectional dependent on the emergence of EU-identification (e.g. Christin 2008, pp #177; Mau 
2005; Fuchs & Klingemann 2011; Lucarelli 2011). With regard to their operationalisation, 
some are even equating EU-identification and EU-support - and others skip the role of identi-
ty as a whole (Haller 2009; Kritzinger 2003; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). This means that these 
two concepts are not clearly differentiated in literature. 
Also, various research interests are related to the topic: for instance the role of welfare re-
gimes, partisanship, occupation, mobility, and the link between attitudes towards the nation 
and the EU (Kumlin 2009; Mau 2005). These research interests fragment the scientific field. 
Apart from sociological approaches, other disciplines, such as political sciences, economics, 
philosophy and psychology have stepped into this research realm and offer promising ap-
proaches. To date, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that every scholar goes their own way. 
                                                 
20 e.g. Bruter (2006, p 174); Carey (2002, p 390); Köngeter (2013); Meyer in Bain & Holland (2007, p 30)  
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This hampers scientific synergies; only few common standards and little consensus have yet 
been established.  
 
2.1.1 Findings of qualitative and quantitative research  
 
Qualitative studies are rare although they bear crucial potential in this research field. In quan-
titative research, mainly descriptive figures, regressions and multi-level-models are used to 
show descriptives and causalities. This section provides a short overview of qualitative and 
quantitative research highlighting their assets and drawbacks. 
 
Qualitative research: the national ‘framing’ of the EU  
In this dynamic field of research, “[q]ualitative studies on citizens’ EU-attitudes [are] compar-
atively new” (Bücker 2012, pp 18 f.). The current development is due to “general doubts 
about the appropriateness of the quantitative or ’variable oriented approach’” (ib.). Qualitative 
studies are conducted in order to understand national and individual attitudes towards Europe 
that cannot be gathered by quantitative data. This research realm contains both macro level 
approaches, e.g. national “public frames” (ib.), and micro level approaches, e.g. by conduct-
ing interviews on ‘European social classes’ (Fligstein 2008; Rautenfeld 2011). At the macro 
level, qualitative research allows for the analysis of country-specific historical background, 
national value orientations, national identity-patterns, and public media21; at the micro level, 
in-depth-interviews can reveal crucial insights as to how EU-attitude emerges and what di-
mensions and causalities are related to it. 
Qualitative studies are often interview-based, such as the work of Bücker whose interdiscipli-
nary work is rooted in sociological and psychological approaches. She presents firstly a criti-
cal overview of the research field’s ‘state of the art’ and shows a reflected proceeding in her 
own research. Furthermore, she suggests convincing systematisations of EU-attitude, EU-
support and their target objects. In the perspective of social constructivism, Bücker succeeds 
in developing an innovative and empathic research design that examines ideal typical fram-
ings of the EU22 by Polish and Eastern German citizens. She argues that the public discourse 
is one of the most crucial factors of these public frames: these frames represent a national 
“horizon of meaning” (Bücker 2012, p 281). The results show that there is only little overlap 
                                                 
21 Haller (2009); Bücker (2012); Regös (2013) 
22 “Frames” are defined as guiding principles that structure human action and attitude construction (Bücker 2012, 
pp 292 f.).  
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of Eastern German and Polish public frames: this supports the hypothesis that national frames 
are predominant compared to European and individual frames. With regard to the study at 
hand, this finding highlights the relevance of differentiated national attitudes towards the EU 
which can hardly be gathered by quantitative analyses.  
Guinaudeau gives a case in point how to combine quantitative individual data and qualitative 
historical deliberations. Her case study traces how French citizens shape ‘their own’ national 
European identity. She argues that a strong political national identification increases EU-
identity whereas a strong cultural national identification decreases it (see also ch. 3.3.3). 
Thus, “national political cultures do play a role shaping citizens’ evaluation of the European 
project” which supports the idea of nation-states working as moderators between individual 
characteristics and their stance towards the EU (Guinaudeau 2011).  
Another qualitative study that focuses on the macro level is conducted by Haller. He develops 
nine ideal typical country clusters which consider a nation’s unique historical backdrop and 
descriptives based on individual data (Haller 2009, pp 298 ff.). Haller’s country clustering 
thus combines qualitative-evaluative and quantitative methods23. The historical-institutional 
considerations include sensitive analyses of ‘national’ emotions towards the EU and specific 
narratives related to it. One might criticise that the nine ideal typical country clusters seem to 
overlook the connection to its citizens. Nevertheless, I argue that Haller’s work is a role model 
for future research.  
Other studies working with clusters often simply assume that geographical closeness is the 
decisive factor. This results mostly in ‘mainstream clusters’ of ‘Core’, ‘Southern’, ‘Scandina-
vian’, and ‘Eastern’ countries (e.g. Mau 2005; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000, p 156). In this study, the 
author tries to step back from this presupposition24. 
 
Qualitative research highlights the importance of a sensitive insight into the peo-
ple’s stance towards the EU. Country-specific public frames play a decisive role 
and create a “horizon of meaning” which is induced by national institutions and 
public media.  
 
Quantitative research: interaction of individual and institutional variables 
Both individualistic and institutionalist approaches are applied in quantitative research – often 
                                                 
23 Some ideal type descriptions are relevant for the present study’s clustering (see ch. 5.5) 
24 For practical reasons the wording of ‘Core’, ‘Southern’, ‘Scandinavian’, and ‘Eastern’ countries is 
nevertheless used. 
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combined as a multi-level analysis; thus, the data used is gathered on micro level and/or mac-
ro level. Investigations with focus on individualistic assumptions mostly present descriptive 
figures on European identity and support. The main finding is that EU-attitude differs enor-
mously i) among member states and ii) they depend heavily on the questionnaire item used – 
which partly leads to inconsistent results among studies. For instance, many member states, 
such as Austria, Sweden, Italy, Greece, and Hungary are said to be Euro-sceptical in some 
analyses - and in others they seem Euro-enthusiastic (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011; Fligstein 
2008, p 142; Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, p 205; Risse-Kappen 2010). An explanation for 
these inconsistencies has not yet been found and points to a severe research gap25.  
Quantitative studies often show interaction effects between the national and individual level. 
Depending on the member state, an individual variable has a certain effect on EU-attitude. 
For instance, the effect of a high occupational status can lead to stronger EU-support in one 
country, and in another one it leads to weaker EU-support (Cerutti & Lucarelli 2008; Fligstein 
2008; Kumlin 2009).  
Neil Fligstein presents a comprehensive study concerned with individual characteristics in his 
monograph ‘Euroclash’. It is one of the most relevant works in this research field and contains 
comparative cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses on European identity. Fligstein’s longi-
tudinal data shows that there is no significant increase in strength of European identity from 
1988 until 2004 (Fligstein 2008, p 142). France, Italy, and Germany feature a strong EU-
identity; contrary to Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, and Greece26. A crucial limita-
tion is that Eastern European countries are missing (Fligstein 2008, p 160). The follow-up 
investigation cover exactly this issue: a new article by Fligstein et al. considers the bail-outs 
in 2010/11 as critical juncture and presents new Eurobarometer data. They show that the fig-
ures on identifying as ‘European’ has become slightly lower during the crisis but is generally 
stable over time. Again, strong national differences lead to the assumption that the emergence 
probability of EU-identification and EU-support is influenced by nationality (Fligstein 2012, 
pp 111 ff.) (see ch. 3). One of the most remarkable findings is that there seems to be ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ of the European project. Fligstein regards occupational status27 as the main influ-
ence factor on the assignment to these groups (besides e.g. age, gender, and education28) 
                                                 
25 As far as the author knows, no research attempts have yet been published to analyse this shortcoming. 
26 This item is criticised due to the used item: feeling as ‘only European’ is a very rare answer in every country 
(average: 3.9%) (Fligstein 2008, p 141); it would have been more appropriate to include the feeling of being 
“European and national” and /or “national and European”.  
27 Unfortunately, the effect of occupational status is not identified by each country, only dummy-variables are 
used statistical regressions which do not account for interaction effects. 
28 This is opposed to Christin’s findings that claim gender and age insignificant factors – in contrast to 
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(Fligstein 2008, pp 160 ff.; Fligstein 2012, p 118). This finding points to the possibility that 
not only national institutions work as decisive factor but also ‘transnational assignment’ to 
groups, e.g. a ‘European elite’29.  
The following paragraphs highlight the institutionalist approach (e.g. Allam & Goerres 2011; 
Christin 2008; Easton 1965, pp 154 ff.; Kritzinger 2003; Mau 2005). In general, many of 
these works also contain individual data and conduct a comparative evaluation of explanatory 
macro variables. These institutional macro variables are various with regard to their manifes-
tation. There are ‘hard’ indicators, such as years of EU membership, welfare regime type, and 
dominant parties; on the other hand, there are ‘soft’ indicators, such as the country’s ‘identity 
type’, and value orientation.  
Christin wrote a comprehensive and well-structured monograph on citizen’s support towards 
the EU. It is interdisciplinary and applies a broad scope of theoretical approaches. It contains 
theoretical explanations of support, measurement issues, systematisation attempts, and multi-
level models. Above that, Christin applies two EU-framing dimensions to analyse the attitude 
towards national and European entities: firstly, the stance towards the political community is 
measured by attachment; secondly, and the attitude towards regime institutions is measured 
by trust (Christin 2008, p 80)30.  
The study of Brinegar highlights cross-level-interactions and argues that contextual and indi-
vidual factors are crucial for support of European integration. The study reveals different atti-
tudes towards the EU which are influenced by occupation types. These depend for their part 
strongly on the country’s welfare regime type and skill endowments type (Brinegar & Jolly 
2005). Thus, institutionalist and individual factors seem to be highly intertwined and, again, 
national institutions work as ‘moderators’. 
Although most of these scholars claim that each country’s context provides a unique backdrop 
for the relationship of individual characteristics, country dummies are – at best – commonly 
used in statistical regressions which do not account for the moderator effect (Carey 2002, p 
391). 
 
Quantitative research suggests that national institutions work as ‘moderating vari-
able’ between individual attributes and EU-attitude. Both institutional and indi-
vidual factors seem to be decisive and require simultaneous analyses. 
                                                                                                                                                        
identification, education, and political sophistication (Christin 2008). 
29 Opposed to findings of Rautenfeld (2011) 
30 These dimensions serve as a role model for this work (see ch. 3.2.2). 
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2.1.2 Concepts of identity  
 
A comprehensive summary on concepts of identity31 would go beyond the scope of this work. 
Therefore, this section presents studies that provide inspiration for the research design at 
hand. The following paragraphs introduce concepts which prepare this study’s understanding 
of EU-identification (see ch. 3.2.1) and crucial elements of the two-dimensional EU-framing 
(see ch. 3.2.2). 
Checkel and Katzenstein manage to present comprehensive and sophisticated deliberations on 
European identity. Their anthology includes sociological, anthropological, historical, and po-
litical perspectives (Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, pp 1 ff.). EU-identity is mostly figured as 
process initiated by a top-down construction of nations and the EU. Checkel & Katzenstein 
notice that utilitarian approaches and mathematized methodologies became more and more 
important which takes constraints and incentives induced by the EU into account (Checkel & 
Katzenstein 2009, pp 7 ff.). This new ‘rationalized’ mainstream perspective however hampers 
sociological approaches that could improve understanding of this ‘supra-identity’. Thus, EU-
identity remains an undefined mystery: research has not helped yet to understand why it 
emerges, how it is triggered, what ‘kinds of identities’ exist, and - last but not least - what it 
actually is. 
Risse-Kappen also presents a very sensitive comparison of identity measures. He focuses on 
collective identity concepts by using descriptive aggregated data (Risse-Kappen 2010). The 
author claims that the “Europeanization of National Identities” has occurred. In this point of 
view, national identity is always the - more or less - fertile ‘soil’ on which European identity 
grows in a unique way: although there are countless ‘kinds’ of how Europe exists in the minds 
of citizens they show these national characteristics. According to Risse-Kappen, citizens of 
Western and Southern countries are more likely to be Europeanized than citizens from Scan-
dinavia and the United Kingdom. He also introduces the concept of exclusive and inclusive 
national identities (cf. ch. 3.3.3): inclusive national identities are more prone to allow EU-
identification and are predominant in Germany, France, Spain, and Italy; whereas exclusive 
national identities hamper the emergence of EU-identification and are predominant in Fin-
land, Sweden and Great Britain (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 46)32.  
Another concept mentions the emergence of an “identity light” version among some countries 
                                                 
31 Literature on European support is left out since its conceptualisation is less multifaceted. Its elaboration is 
conducted in chapters 2.1.1 and 3.2.2. 
32 Other studies use alternative operationalisations and show different results; Germany, France and Sweden 
often show contradicting results (e.g. Haller 2009, p 306). 
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(Karolewski 2011, p 952): this ‘light’ identity becomes evident when solid support and soli-
darity which imply short-term costs is needed. This ‘light’ identity is disadvantageous when 
critical junctures occur such as economic crises. According to Gerhards results, only the Swe-
dish and Dutch are ‘real’ solidary supporters in contrast to Germany and many Southern Eu-
ropean states that feature a rather pragmatic stance (Gerhards 2008). This is a surprising find-
ing since most studies suggest that the Dutch and Scandinavians are very Eurosceptic. These 
inconsistencies call again for a more detailed examination of EU-identification and EU-
support. Furthermore, the results of Risse-Kappen describe an unstable EU-attitude among 
‘Eastern’ countries: although coordinated EU action was favoured by these nations during the 
last financial, economic, and national crises, their citizens seem to change their attitude to-
wards the EU very fast when confronted by disadvantages. Risse-Kappen explains that atti-
tude by a predominant rational ‘EU-framing’ whose mechanism of evaluation is based on 
cost-benefit calculation (Risse-Kappen 2010, pp 184, 251).  
Fuchs’ anthology includes several theoretical and empirical articles. These contributions work 
on the systematisation of European identity and its political support. As an overall result, 
Fuchs and Klingemann state that a simultaneous identification with the nation-state and Eu-
rope exists: “[c]ountry first, but Europe, too” (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 110). Fuchs 
shows several target objects of identification and support; among others the institutions of the 
regime and the political community (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 32). Keil also works with 
two dimensions, namely i) the trust in political institutions that is based on exchange; “A 
trusts B to do X”: trust relies on the credibility of competence and its evaluation is result-
oriented; this kind of trust shows only weak stability. The second dimension is ii) the cultur-
al/community-based approach; “A trusts B”: this concept does not include the evaluation of 
specific outputs; whereas socialisation, positive narratives, and identification with B is crucial 
to exhibit this kind of trust which is relatively stable (Maloney 2010, p 211, cf. ch. 3.2.2). 
The previously presented case study of Guinaudeau on French identification with the EU dif-
ferentiates cultural and political identity. A strong national cultural identity has a negative 
impact on the emergence of European identity, whereas a strong political identity has a posi-
tive one (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, pp 133 ff.)33. Many similar dualistic concepts are found, 
such as inclusive vs. exclusive, civic vs. ethnic, and complementary vs. conflicting identities; 
they all describe a slightly different understanding how to capture identity34.  
 
                                                 
33 cf. Köngeter (2013) 
34 A theoretical connection of these identity/identification concepts is lacking so far. 
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‘European identity’ is difficult to grasp and requires sensitive examination and 
systematisation. Relevant literature differentiates between national identity type 
(inclusive and exclusive), societal spheres (political and cultural), target objects 
(political institutions and community), and derived type of support. 
 
2.1.3 Explanatory national institutions  
 
This section presents basic literature on macro level approaches that aim to explain country-
specific EU-attitude by national institutions35. The presented studies indicate starting points 
for the derivation of the three explanatory models that are elaborated in chapter 3.3 and ap-
plied in chapter 5.5.  
Many studies refer to Gabel’s journal article as one of the most meaningful works of this re-
search realm. He presents five explanatory hypotheses and tests their relevance for EU-
support (Gabel 1998). Many scientists have refined these explanatory approaches and three 
dominant “families of explanation” are commonly identified nowadays. In comparative anal-
yses, the studies’ explanatory variables mostly combine i) economic models, ii) collective 
identities, and iii) political cues36.  
The term “economic model” is ambiguous: according to Bücker, it represents the i) utilitarian 
perspective of the 1990s37. Therefore, decisive explanatory factors are “sociotropic utilitarian-
ism” - rating economic consequences on national level - and “egocentric utilitarianism” in-
cluding personal consequences38 (Bücker 2012, pp 40 f.; Cerutti & Lucarelli 2008; Gabel 
1998). Another definition is presented by Christin who describes the “economic model” as the 
ii) individual’s value orientation towards the EU which is either based on materialist or post-
materialist values. Post-materialist values are defined as advantageous for the emergence of 
                                                 
35 The term ‘institution’ is used in its broader sense of rules that structure social relationships (Hall 1986, p 7); 
these rules emerge consciously and unconsciously (Hillmann 2007: 381). There are ‘hard’ indicators, such as 
years of EU membership, welfare regime type, and dominant parties; on the other hand, there are ‘soft’ 
indicators, such as the country’s ‘identity type’, and value orientation. 
36 Cerutti tests whether economic reasons, national identity or political attitude has an impact on EU-support 
(Cerutti & Lucarelli 2008). He shows that personal utility (e.g. political and economic stability, personal safety) 
influences significantly support. Also, European identity and cultural threats are significant. 
37 In conflict with Bücker, Christin argues that cost-benefit approaches were added in the 2000’s. 
38 Gabel approved that economic interests reflect the attitude towards the EU. He analysed cost-benefit 
calculations for two different occupational groups. Interestingly, income has a positive effect on EU-support for 
managers and professionals, but a negative one for manual workers. Gabel explains this by the fear of stronger 
competition within the more open European labour market that mainly threatens lower-skilled workers due to 
exchangeability (Gabel 1998). 
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EU-identification and EU-support39 (Christin 2008, pp 31 ff.). This definition on value orien-
tation is applied in the study at hand and chapter 3.3 elaborates concrete theoretical deriva-
tions.  
Beyond this, Christin checks several independent variables to explain EU-support. Among 
other macro variables, an economic dimension, the political opportunity cost model (see ch. 
3.2.2), and the national identity type (see ch. 3.3.3) are tested. Interestingly, the ‘baseline’ 
macro variables - as duration of membership, federalism, post-communist background, 
GDP40, and population size - are not significant in multi-level regressions. Only the ‘national 
identity type’, measured as the country’s mean of exclusive national identity, and the ‘political 
opportunity cost model’, operationalized by national governance quality, are highly signifi-
cant in every regression (Christin 2008, pp 55, 73, 76). In short, a strong exclusive/ethnic na-
tional identity and a high average mean of satisfaction with national governance decrease EU-
support. 
Also, several other scholars found evidence for the opportunity cost model with regard to dif-
ferent research units (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Munoz, Torcal & Bonet 2011; Kumlin 2009; 
Mau 2005). Sanchez-Cuenca focused on variables that measure corruption and social protec-
tion to explain EU-support. Munoz analyses the ‘trust relationship’ between national and Eu-
ropean institutions. This relationship is mostly positive which supports the shortcut model (see 
ch. 3.3.2). Only citizens with extremely well-evaluated national institutions show a negative 
relationship.  
On the other hand, Mau’s results support the opportunity cost model: he shows that Mediter-
ranean countries are mostly in favour of European welfare politics while the national welfare 
regime is assessed as under-average. On the other hand, ‘core’ and particularly Scandinavian 
countries show the expected negative evaluation of a European welfare program41.  
The last paragraphs introduced the three promising explanatory approaches that are elaborated 
in chapter 3.3. The selection proved problematic with regard to numerous explanatory ap-
proaches and - often contradicting - results42. Value orientation is included since some studies 
                                                 
39 Interestingly, materialist motives were particularly important for fresh member states as ‘Southern’ countries, 
Denmark, and Ireland. ‘Eastern’ countries are missing since this study was conducted in 1998. 
40 except a few models 
41 Christin (2008, pp 31 ff.) 
42 These explanatory variables were concurrently tested by Allam, Christin and Fuchs with diverging results. 
However, the studies’ research designs and operationalisations were different so that comparison proves 
problematic. Christin shows that high national governance quality and exclusive national identity have strong 
negative effects on EU-support (Christin 2008). Fuchs included utilitarian explanatory variables, European 
identity and national political institutions. Results are presented by country and reveal that utilitarian reasons for 
support are prevalent (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011). Allam and Goerres find in a sample of post-communist 
countries that national political reference points (i.e. satisfaction with national democracy) have a positive 
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show its significant impact on both EU-identification and EU-support – although this effect 
seems rather weak. The second explanatory approach is the opportunity cost model which is 
supported by many studies. Although this model has mainly been tested with regard to EU-
support it can also be applied to EU-identification. Only a little empirical research has yet 
been conducted on the influence of multiple identities due to problematic retrieval and the 
topic’s abstractness. Nevertheless, the national identity type seems auspicious with regard to 
its explanatory power. The utilitarian approach that deals with cost-benefit calculations is not 
included. This is due to the literature’s findings that it merely explains EU-support but not 
EU-identification.  
 
The most promising approaches to explain EU-identification and EU-support are 
the national value orientation, the political opportunity cost model, and the na-
tional identity type.  
 
2.2 Research gaps and this study’s point of contact 
 
This chapter shows the shortcomings of this scientific realm and introduces relevant starting 
points for this study. The research field’s relevance is reflected by a rising number of publica-
tions. One overall ‘result’ can be taken for granted: the evaluation of national EU-
identification and EU-support draws a picture as varied as the number of publications.  
Little consensus is identified in this research field and the findings are strongly dependent on 
the selection of questionnaire items: although the items are supposed to measure the same 
latent construct, their figures differ enormously which leads to inconsistent results43. These 
grave differences have not yet been analysed and point to a severe research gap. Undoubtedly, 
it is pointless to conduct deductive research without valid and reliable operationalisation (e.g. 
Schnell 2008: 149 ff.). The deficits may be due to data assessment itself, but also missing 
consensus on concepts of identity and support are severe issues. Another shortcoming is that 
the practice of applying transdisciplinary approaches, e.g. political sciences, history, and psy-
chology, is lacking. In particular, available knowledge of psychological retrieval and identifi-
                                                                                                                                                        
impact (pointing to the shortcut-model). Interestingly, subjective perception of personal economic conditions has 
no significant effect but perception of the national economy is significant (Allam & Goerres 2011, pp 1417 ff.). 
43 As aforementioned, some countries as France, Austria, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and Hungary are partly said 
to be euro-sceptic and partly euro-enthusiastic; Christin (2008, p 62); Lucarelli (2011, p 60); Fuchs & 
Klingemann (2011, pp 70 f., 77, 80 f., 137); Guibernau (2011, p 37); Gabel (1998, p 347); Checkel & 
Katzenstein (2009, p 205). 
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cation concepts have hardly been implemented to date (Gigerenzer & Selten 2001, p 53; 
Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 105, 126 f., 131).  
 
Summing up, the following issues show the research field’s shortcomings: 
• The assumption of a one-directional causality between identity as independent and 
support as dependent variable is dominant; EU-identification works as a sufficient (and 
partly necessary) condition for EU-support. This assumption is reflected by many da-
tasets that ascertain either identity or support items. Also, ‘hybrid’ questionnaire items 
present both identity and support at once.  
In cases where the identity and support variables are available in one dataset, they are 
hardly combinable due to different target objects (e.g. EU as institution vs. continental 
Europe vs. Europeans vs. EU policy). 
• EU-attitude is almost never44 analysed in terms of societal spheres. Analysing politi-
cal, cultural, economic or global spheres seems a promising approach to find answers 
on causalities and national EU-framings.  
• A general problem of latent constructs as identity and identification45 is the individual 
retrieval. Due to the interviewees’ unawareness towards questions on this fragile con-
cept, it is difficult to predict which answers can be ‘taken seriously’. This calls for 
well tested and sensitive questionnaire items.  
• Psychological modes of affectual and cognitive retrieval and reasoning have not yet 
been tested although they seem enormously important for response behaviour46.  
• The underestimation of national characteristics is a very intriguing issue. Although 
most scholars admit that countries work as moderating variables, results are presented 
in an inadequate way. For instance, they refer to all member states or show country 
dummies.  
The nation-state with its distinct institutions, narratives, media, and historical/cultural 
background firstly requires qualitative case analyses47.  
 
The presentation of these research gaps shall not disparage the achievements of the single 
                                                 
44 Exceptions are Maloney (2010, p 211) and Fuchs & Klingemann (2011, pp 133–136).  
45 The meaning and application of both constructs is explained in chapter 3.2.1. 
46 The results depend on the way of reasoning which can be either affectual or cognitive. For instance, the 
wording and order of items trigger retrieval modes (Gigerenzer & Selten 2001, p 53). 
47 This calls for more qualitative investigation and makes mathematized multi-level analyses questionable. Also, 
multiple moderating effects complicate interpretation of results enormously. Methods as ‘Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis’ (QCA) seem to be more appropriate with regard to these sensitive latent constructs. 
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contributions in this research field. Rather, the missing common theoretical fundament proves 
problematic since it is indispensable as a base for scientific work and its evaluation. To date, 
there is no common scholarly ‘language’ in this research field which hampers further devel-
opment. The study at hand certainly contributes to a minor extent. Nevertheless, some of the 
points mentioned above shall be addressed in this work:   
• EU-identification and EU-support are analysed independently as two autonomous con-
cepts. This allows the four ideal types of which two have not yet been analysed. They 
are supposed to reveal insight into national characteristics and more qualitative pat-
terns of national EU-attitude. 
• Psychological approaches are considered; the concept of affective and cognitive re-
trieval is a crucial component of the research design.  
• Two societal spheres are analysed in order to reveal meaningful qualitative insights 
with regard to national characteristics and EU-framing: the economic-political and so-
cio-cultural sphere. 
• The research design’s aim is to ‘map’ characteristic national EU-attitude by combining 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation. Therefore, country-specific interpretation of 
results involving institutional macro level background is presented (see ch. 5.2 and 
5.3). The elaboration of country clusters facilitates these first ‘mapping’ attempts (see 
ch. 5.5). 
 
It goes without saying that it is hard to live up to these demanding aims. Respective general 
limitations and data restrictions are described in chapter 1.3 and 4.3 pointing to this work’s 
shortcomings. 
 
3 Theory 
 
After presenting the research landscape and its various approaches in the previous chapter, the 
following paragraphs introduce theoretical perspectives and assumptions. Chapter 3.2 gives 
definitions of this work’s basic concepts and, lastly, the three explanatory models and their 
estimated effects on EU-attitude are derived in chapter 3.3. 
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3.1 Theoretical perspectives and basic assumptions 
 
Generally, this work follows the tradition of institutionalist approaches introduced in chapter 
2.1.1. Institutionalism is however only the ‘backbone’ of this work: several additional theoret-
ical perspectives are applied due to the present study’s explorative and transdisciplinary 
alignment. This eclecticism is both an asset and a drawback. It is open to multiple comple-
mentary theoretical perspectives and not bound to one paradigm. At the same time, the eclec-
tic approach is criticised for being inconsistent and unscientific. Nevertheless, I argue that the 
synergies of the applied approaches overweigh the shortcomings in this stage of research: this 
way of proceeding provides the required openness to find answers on this unexplored scien-
tific question. 
According to the institutionalist approach48, historically unique and path-dependent49 institu-
tions determine the individuals’ habitual ways of thinking. This happens when these individu-
als ‘internalize’ these institutions and their rationalities. Thus, attitudes and behaviour are 
mainly based on - intended and unintended - ‘top-down’ socialisation. To account for the re-
search question’s demands, the ‘old’50 institutionalism’s comparative tradition and its focus on 
both political and cultural institutions is meaningful for the study at hand (Hillmann & Hart-
fiel 2007, p 382). As aforementioned, countries are the crucial framework that moderates in-
dividual action and attitudes51.  
Furthermore, ideas of the actor-centred institutionalism shall be considered (Nullmeier 2000, 
pp 269 ff.). This perspective focuses on individual actors and their action orientation. The 
individual constructs actively its identity – as opposed to the ‘old’ institutionalist view of ‘top-
down’ socialisation and identity construction. This points to this work’s paradigms of social 
constructivism and symbolic interactionism which are close to this actor-centred institutional-
                                                 
48 As aforementioned, the term ‘institution’ is ambiguous in this work. 1) When related to the EU or nations, its 
political institutions are meant. 2)  In other respects, the term refers to the broad definition of Hall that describes 
nearly all concrete and abstract manifestations of society: institutions are “formal rules, compliance procedures, 
and standard operating procedures that structure the relationships between people” (Hall 1986, p 7). Hence, 
institutions structure social relationships (Hall 1986, p 7); institutions can emerge consciously and unconsciously 
as a result of culture and sense-giving (Hillmann 2007: 381).  
49 Path dependency describes the assumption that ‘history matters’: once a historical track of a given institution 
or polity is established, it is hard to change (Ackermann 2001, p 9). 
50 At first, Max Weber focused on the way how bureaucracy and institutions started to dominate our society. This 
'old' institutionalism focuses on analysing formal institutions of the national government in a comparative 
perspective. Nowadays, the focus has moved to individualistic approaches. In the 1980s, the concept of “new 
institutionalism” arose: authors like Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell revisited Weber's iron cage in the early 
1980s. This approach emphasises smaller social groups as organisations in their environment/organisational field 
(Powell & DiMaggio 1991). 
51 This work’s central institution-based factors that affect EU-attitude are national value orientation (section 
3.3.1), the citizen’s evaluation of national institutions (cf. section 3.3.2), and the national identity type (section 
3.3.3). 
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3.2 Definition of fundamental concepts 
 
Due to a lack of consensus for how to systematize and define basic concepts in this research 
field (cf. ch. 2), the following sections elaborate EU-identification, EU-support and national 
framing as this work’s fundamental concepts of the research design. 
 
3.2.1 EU-identification and EU-support 
 
The construct of EU-identification and EU-support are fundamental for this study. Most stud-
ies of this research field do not analyse EU-identification but European identity - although it 
is “marked by emptiness rather than specific content” (Rautenfeld 2011, p 235). European 
identity is a very abstract, nuanced and sensitive concept that is difficult to grasp - theoreti-
cally and empirically. Beyond this, there are claims that nothing like a collective European 
identity actually exists. The term ‘European identity’ implies that a “collective identity” (em-
phasis added) has already emerged. A “collective identity” is by definition based on believed 
characteristics which find consensus among its self-attributed members. In the case of Euro-
pean identity, the demand of a common understanding is not fulfilled52 - it is even unclear 
what actor(s) might have the authority for interpretation of ‘European identity’ (Roose 2007, p 
126).  
Although related difficulties occur when analysing identification instead of identity, it is more 
accessible and applicable for both theoretical and empirical research. The identification pro-
cess is based on the individual’s subjective perception and evaluation of a target object. This 
process relates to the individual’s “personal identity” (emphasis added) that “bridges [the] gap 
between the self and the outside world”: individuals construct a link to external entities in 
order to build up a positive self-concept. This happens by identifying with positively attribut-
ed individuals or groups (Roose 2007, pp 132 f.). “Personal identity” is more appropriate than 
“collective identity” when analysing identification with the EU, Europe or Europeans. It has 
‘weaker’ demands than the concept of identity and refers to the subjective evaluation which 
                                                 
52 A collectively shared perception of ‘Europeanness’ is unlikely due to a nation-specific point of view on the EU 
and “discriminating particularisms” among heterogeneous nation-states that feature a power disequilibrium. By 
this, Europe “will never end up in a coherent narrative” due to “diverse backgrounds, beliefs, lifestyles” 
(Rautenfeld 2011, p 237). 
Also, a study conducted by Rautenfeld compares German and UK actors who work for Europe-related university 
programs as ‘European studies’. Even among this Bologna process’ new ‘European elite’ no common EU 
perception is found (Rautenfeld 2011, p 228). 
Also, a homogenous identity seems impossible due to the EU’s “discriminating particularisms” between very  
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does not need a collective understanding of the target object.  
Another point that requires explanation is the decision to examine EU-identification - and not 
European identification. Firstly, ‘Europe’ is a very broad research object that lacks sharp 
boundaries - both in terms of geography and the respondents’ associated meanings which 
range from cultural through political to social ‘frames’. Secondly, a general attempt of this 
work is to provide political implications. The ‘closest’ research object that is - theoretically - 
capable of acting and reacting on these implications is the EU.  
The definition of EU-support is based on the work of Easton. He argues that a political system 
such as the EU creates “outputs” (decisions and actions) which require the citizens’ “inputs” 
(demands and support) (Easton 1965, pp 154 ff.). Thus, the role of citizens is to evaluate the 
system’s actions and provide support where appropriate. Hence, EU-support is perceived as 
an active endorsement towards political target objects in question (Easton 1965, p 177)53. 
 
Due to the nebulosity of ‘European identity’, the concept of EU-identification is 
applied. This concept is not in need of a shared collective identity but based on 
the personal identification process. The concept of EU-support refers to the ac-
tive endorsement towards political and social entities. 
 
3.2.2 Framing the EU - a dualistic concept  
 
The attempt of this work is to find out, how a predetermined EU-framing influences the na-
tional EU-attitude. This proceeding adds an additional qualitative aspect to this analysis. Two 
ideal typical dimensions of EU-framing are elaborated in the following, namely the rational 
and the emotional dimension. This section prepares the theoretical framework and its ele-
ments for this dualistic concept that is applied in the research design. The presented elements 
(see table 3) are numerous and rather wide-ranging due to the explorative state of research54. 
Hence, the dimensions’ design requires theoretical refinement and further abstraction.  
According to literature, every country exhibits a unique national EU-framing due to its “pub-
lic frames” (Bücker 2012, cf. ch. 2.1.1). These “public frames” are initiated by national media 
and institutions, public debates, and collective narratives. In literature, this framing is usually 
translated into a dualistic concept. Roughly speaking, there is i) a rather rational stance to-
                                                 
53 Since this work analyses a broad scope including the emotional dimension (see ch. 3.2.2), also the European 
community is analysed as target object of EU-support. 
54 There is a lack of the elements’ theoretical connection. 
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wards EU-institutions and its policy, and ii) an emotion-driven stance towards EU-community 
and its values/principles.  
A prime example of research is Kritzinger’s analysis of two societal spheres, i.e. a political 
and an economic dimension. The two dimensions show quite opposed results55 which supports 
the meaning of EU-framing within the research design. A second understanding of framing is 
prevailing in literature: Bücker finds ‘primary’ framings in her qualitative analysis. This refers 
to what comes first to people’s minds when they think of the EU. In the study at hand, it is not 
possible to find these spontaneous ‘primary’ framings due to restrictions of the quantitative 
retrieval technique56.  
A starting point for the elaboration of the dualistic concept is “The Civic Culture” of Almond 
and Verba which serves as a theoretical backdrop of this section. The authors claim that a 
democratic political culture contains a set of beliefs and attitudes that supports the citizens’ 
participation57. By this, citizens can exhibit “cognitive”, “affective”, and “evaluative” orienta-
tions towards political objects (Almond & Sidney Verba 1989, pp 15, 178). Two of these ori-
entations are role models of this study58: the “evaluative” orientation resembles the rational 
dimension and the “affective” orientation is close to the emotional dimension. Further ele-
ments of these two dimensions are elaborated in the following paragraphs.  
First however, I want to point out a general problem of this concept: scholars argue whether 
the “affective orientation” towards the EU is actually relevant – if at all possible. For instance, 
Habermas claims that only civic identification is of importance (Habermas 2006). Another 
point is that Europe is said to be ‘only’ a “Staatsnation” - usually a “Kulturnation” needs to be 
established before so that emotional attachment and cohesion is ensured (Checkel & Katzen-
stein 2009, p 208). According to this understanding, the existence of an “affective orienta-
tion” towards the EU might not be possible at all. This work does not engage in discussing 
the general importance of the “affective” orientation type for EU-support – although this de-
bate is increasingly relevant - but I argue that this emotional commitment towards the EU is i) 
required in the present and even more in future;  and it is ii) actually already ‘real’ as a citi-
                                                 
55 A positive relationship between national and EU-attitude is observed in the economic sphere and a negative 
one in the political sphere. This means that attitudes towards the nation are partly ‘projected’ and partly reversed 
into a ‘zero-sum-game’. 
56 Although there are some Eurobarometer items which try to take this consideration into account, the retrieval 
mechanism shows severe shortcomings. Qualitative analyses are more appropriate for analyses of ‘primary’ 
framing. 
57 Debating the democratic quality of the EU goes beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, I assume that the 
EU and its citizenship are based on democratic principles which make this concept applicable. 
58 When transferring this concept to EU-institutions, the cognitive orientation seems too weak for the research 
design at hand (Almond & Verba 1989, pp 22 f.); 
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zens’ EU-attitude59. 
The previously introduced work of Easton applies systems theory to political science and 
highlights the importance of the political system’s inputs (demands and support) and outputs 
(decisions and actions) (Easton 1965, pp 154 ff.). A distinction is made between specific and 
diffuse support. Specific support represents the environment’s satisfaction with concrete polit-
ical outputs; it can change fast because it depends on the cognitive evaluation of present in-
formation. Diffuse support is based on the “evaluations of what an object is or represents” 
(emphasis added); this kind of support is more stable and based on affective emotions and 
socialisation processes (Easton 1965, pp 439 ff.)60.  
According to Easton, target objects of the environment’s support are political authorities, the 
political community, and the political regime (Easton 1965, p 177). Since political authorities 
play a subordinated role in the EU context, this target object is crossed out for the conceptual-
isation at hand. Through this, Easton combines the support type with the target object: the 
political community is the target of diffuse support, whereas specific support is directed to-
wards the political regime.  
The two dimensions are closely linked to EU-identification. The rational dimension refers to 
Habermas’ civic identification and the emotional dimension to the affective identification. Af-
fective identification is based on emotional attachment to a social group, whereas civic identi-
fication is based on the formal affiliation to a collective that shares common rationalities61.  
Also, Max Weber’s ideal types of ‘social action’ are relevant as motivation modes towards the 
EU. The active evaluation and attitude formation towards the EU is considered to be an ‘ac-
tion’ so that this concept can be applied. The rational dimension relates to “purposive-rational 
action” (“zweckrationales Handeln”) and the emotional dimension to “affectual” and “value-
oriented action” (“affektuelles” and “wert-rationales Handeln”) (Weber 1984a, pp 44 ff.).  
As previously mentioned, psychological approaches are hardly ever taken into account but 
they play a crucial role in this concept. Eagly describes two modes of retrieval which are pro-
cessed by the “central” and “peripheral route”. The central route processes information by 
computing a cognitive evaluation (Eagly & Chaiken 1993, p 305); the peripheral route uses 
                                                 
59 The definition as ‘real’ is meant as subjective perception process (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 952 f.) which 
relates to philosophical deliberations as the Thomas Theorem. 
60 Also, Kumlin suggests two support types: the utilitarian one - referring to specific support and featuring a 
short-termed commitment and affective support which refers to diffuse support. This kind is acquired by 
socialisation and features long-term commitment (Kumlin 2009). 
61 It is to add that civic identification is a very restricted kind of ‘identification’ since the mere recognition of 
common rationalities seems very weak condition for ‘real’ identification. 
 28
heuristic shortcuts which results in quick emotional responses62. Scholars presume that affec-
tual and cognitive retrieval modes affect the attitude formation towards the EU significantly 
(Bücker 2012, p 32; Hitlin & Piliavin 2004, p 379)63.  
These single elements of the dimensions are shown in the first column of table 3. The ele-
ments of each dimension are highly intertwined. Concerning the rational dimension, civic 
identification and specific support can be improved by perceived advantages initiated by EU-
institutions. With regard to the emotional dimension, it seems difficult to improve affective 
identification and diffuse support. In the long run, either a consensus on perceived socio-
cultural principles or a strengthened attachment to the community might be relevant issues 
(see ch. 6.2). These deliberations lead to the associated societal spheres of ideal types: the 
rational dimension relates content-wise to the political-economic sphere and the emotional 
dimension to the socio-cultural sphere. 
 
The two ideal type dimensions are defined as follows: 
 
• The rational dimension considers content-wise a political-economic sphere and is re-
trieved by cognitive reasoning.  
Specific support towards the political regime and its policy is dependent on the posi-
tive, information-based evaluation of its performance. 
 
• The emotional dimension focuses content-wise on the socio-cultural sphere and is re-
trieved by affectual sentiments.  
Diffuse support towards the political community and its ideals/principles is dependent 
on the positively associated sense of belonging. 
 
The described tight relationship of the dimensions’ elements is highly simplified due to the 
conceptual decision to work with ideal types. It goes without saying that this dualistic concept 
does not reflect all the nuanced complexities of this sensitive research object. Furthermore, 
application of this scheme to actual questionnaire items contains problematic restraints (see 
ch. 4.3). 
The elements in question are shown below and include the differentiation of evaluative and 
                                                 
62 Studies show that these affective, quick answers are more stable over time and are better predictors for 
behaviour (Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 127 f.). 
63 Bücker also mentions a “behavioural” source of attitudes based on concrete experiences. But since only few 
individuals directly interact with the EU, she suggests crossing it out (Bücker 2012, p 32). 
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affective orientation towards political entities (Almond & Sidney Verba 1989), specific and 
diffuse support, speed of attitude change, target objects (Easton 1965), identification types 
(Habermas 2006), retrieval modes (Eagly & Chaiken 1993, p 305), motivation types (Weber 
1984a), and societal spheres.  
 
The rational and emotional dimensions allow retrieval of two ideal-typical EU-
frames in order to show detailed characteristics of national EU-attitude. 
 
 
Table 3: Overview of rational and emotional dimension as ideal-typical EU-framing 
 Rational dimension Emotional dimension 
‘Civic culture’-orientation  Evaluative orientation Affective orientation 
Support type Specific support Diffuse support 
Attitude change Short-termed, information Long-term, socialisation 
Target objects Political institutions, policy Community, ideals/principles 
EU-identification type Civic ‘identification’ Affective identification 
Motivation type Purposive-rational motive Affectual & value-rat. motive 
Retrieval mode Central route: cognitive Peripheral route: heuristic 
Societal sphere Economic-political Socio-cultural 
Source: own presentation 
 
 
3.3 National institutions: Three explanatory models  
 
Following the presented literature, this chapter elaborates three theoretical explanations of 
EU-attitude and their hypothetical predictions based on institutional assumptions64 (cf. ch. 
2.1.3 and 3.1). Scheme 2 visualizes this idea as causality diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Scheme 2 shows three explanatory models based on national institutions. Thus, the ‘political opportunity cost 
model’ refers to the mechanism (nation state as reference point) and not to a national institution. 
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these elaborations mainly serve as theoretical ‘offers’. They provide a backdrop during the 
research process and they are discussed to a limited extent on base of descriptive macro level 
data (see ch. 5.5). In the following three sections, these explanatory models and their predic-
tion on EU-attitude are derived in detail.  
 
3.3.1 National value orientation  
 
Value orientations shape attitude and behaviour of individuals. In her social psychological 
contribution, Hitlin describes indirectly the meaning of values for EU-attitude. The relation-
ship between values, attitudes, and behaviour are crucial. Values affect “readiness for contact 
with members of an out-group”: certain values produce social trust (as attitude) which results 
in making contact with people from out-groups (as behaviour) (Hitlin & Piliavin 2004, p 382; 
Forbes 1997, p 9 f.).  
Collective ideologies influence and even shape individual values; groups with the ability to 
create these collective ideologies are social groups, classes but also regions and whole na-
tions.  
This work regards the entity of the nation-state as crucial which is supported by “identity the-
ory”. It claims that modern national identities are based on “value-identities” that heavily in-
fluence the citizen’s socialisation process (Hitlin & Piliavin 2004). The nation‘s societal insti-
tutions, such as common political and cultural rationalities, narratives, and mass media are 
decisive in this process.  
Scholars argue that values play an important role for the probability of transnational identifi-
cation and solidary attitude towards other Europeans. But it remains vague what value the best 
predictor is. Several problems arise when working with values: they are difficult to define, to 
retrieve65, and to evaluate. Hence, scholars often label attitudes as values or just ignore their 
impact as a whole.  
In literature, there are several value concepts which seem relevant for the study at hand. It 
goes beyond the scope of this study to introduce all these concepts. Thus, only the work of 
three authors shall be mentioned: Inglehart, Hofstede, and Schwartz present elaborated value 
concepts including questionnaire instruments and ‘value maps’ which locate countries within 
                                                 
65 The interviewees’ accessibility of values is not necessarily possible due to unawareness (Hitlin & Piliavin 
2004, p 364). There are numerous psychological instruments to measure values but the results show that their 
validity is questionable. 
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two dimensions (Maehler & Schmidt-Denter 2013)66. The findings show that countries exhibit 
distinct value patterns and meaningful country clusters are identified. 
One of the most familiar value concepts is Inglehart’s post-materialism thesis. This work ar-
gues that the country’s post-materialist value orientation fosters openness, tolerance and soli-
darity towards out-groups67. They are hence a positive predictor for EU-identification and 
EU-support. In addition, post-materialist values ‘fit’ the European “statement of principles”: 
the EU’s “value-identity” is close to post-materialist values which facilitates identification68 - 
provided that the individual in question also exhibits post-materialist values. 
An additional assumption is that citizens with strong post-materialist values emphasize the 
idealistic claims of the EU and the European community69 due to their biased ‘primary’ fram-
ing. Through this, citizens identify more easily with the EU. However, their high aspirations 
towards EU policy lead to a lower probability that the EU can fulfil them. Thus, post-
materialist values might decrease EU-support (as “value-rational action”). In the case of ful-
filled value-related aspirations, the share of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ increases or, if not, the share of 
‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ does. 
Materialist values result in low identification due to missing openness and mismatch of val-
ues. On the other hand, short-termed EU-support is still possible as long as advantages are 
perceived (as “purposive-rational action”). In the case of perceived advantages, the share of 
‘EU-Pragmatics’ increases, if not, the share of ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’ does.  
Turning to the research question, this work formulates the following prediction with respect to 
the four ideal typical EU-attitudes: 
 
The national value orientation influences the four ideal typical EU-attitudes inso-
far that strong post-materialist values increase the share of ‘sceptical EU-
Idealists’ and/or ‘EU-Enthusiasts’. Strong materialist values increase the share of 
‘EU-Pragmatics’ and/or ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’. 
                                                 
66 Maehler provides a comprehensible overview of these value concepts while elaborating her own ‘value-map’. 
67 Inglehart works with dualistic value concepts: his analyses consider the dimensions self-expression vs. 
survival values and secular-rational vs. traditional values (Inglehart 1990); (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 693). 
According to literature, strong self-expression and secular-rational values facilitate openness and trust towards 
out-groups and transnational institutions. 
68 One can argue that the EU’s liberal stance towards economy is closer to the materialist point of view. I argue 
that these economic actions can be labeled “materialist” in the sense of capitalist orientation. But the EU’s value 
orientation (see the statements of principles) reflects post-materialist values in terms of human rights, 
sustainability, tolerance, etc. 
69 These causalities are supported by “framing theory” that regards values as promising factor to explain public 
frames (Bücker 2012, pp 292 f.; Hitlin & Piliavin 2004): post-materialist values let easier frame on idealist and 
abstract aspects of the EU, whereas materialist values shift the focus to cost-benefit calculations and economic 
aspects. These ‘primary frames’ cannot be analysed in this work due to dataset restrictions (see ch. 3.2.2). 
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Although studies on post-materialist values do not show clear results (Christin 2008, pp 31 ff.; 
Gabel 1998; Risse-Kappen 2010, p 184; Haller 2009, p 327; Anderson & Reichert 1995), its 
potential with regard to country differences is noteworthy. An interesting study on this topic is 
conducted by Anderson who found that post-materialist values have a positive effect on EU-
support in the original six member states and a negative impact in the remaining member 
states (not including Eastern countries). The author’s interpretation is that idealistic notions 
dominate the perception of the EU in the ‘older’ member states’ due to a longer socialisation 
period and more international contact occasions70 - contrary to the ‘new’ members whose in-
dividuals perceive and evaluate material aspects of the EU (Anderson & Reichert 1995)71. 
Risse-Kappen argues that ‘Eastern’ countries’ citizens show a special attitude: although these 
citizens favoured coordinated EU action during the crisis, they seem to change their attitude 
towards the EU fast when confronted with disadvantages72. The supposed explanation is that 
their predominant frame is based on rational and economic reasoning which might be related 
to materialist values (Risse-Kappen 2010, pp 184, 251). Summing up, the literature suggests 
that ‘new’ member states feature a materialist EU-framing73 and, thus, show a relatively high 
share of ‘EU-Pragmatics’ and ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-Affected’.  
 
3.3.2 Political opportunity cost model 
 
In a newspaper article, the Hungarian intellectual Konrád draws the picture that the darker the 
sky for the Hungarian democracy, the brighter the EU shines in the eyes of Hungarian citizens 
(Konrád 2013). This metaphor reflects the general mechanism of the political opportunity cost 
model: since individuals do usually not relate themselves directly with the EU, they use the 
nation-state as a proxy. Thus, the evaluation of the countries’ performance serves as reference 
point for the evaluation of the EU (Marks & Steenbergen 2004, pp 54 ff., 58; Kritzinger 2003, 
p 226). 
The political opportunity-cost-model was introduced by Sánchez-Cuenca. He shows that citi-
zens calculate opportunity costs when transferring sovereignty from the national government 
                                                 
70 cf. contact hypothesis (e.g. Forbes 1997, p 9 f.) 
71 Gabel also found that materialist motives are rather important for ‘new’ member states (Gabel 1998). 
72 Also, Haller’s ideal type of ‘Europe as “end in itself”’ gives hints how the EU is perceived in the new ‘Eastern’ 
citizens. In general, the evaluation of the EU is positive in most Eastern countries. According to Haller, this is 
due to the citizens’ materialist framing on the economic advantages of membership. Nevertheless, Haller 
describes these citizens as “Euroneutral” featuring a “passive participation” without emotional commitment 
(Haller 2009, p 327). Also, Bücker indicates that Polish citizens frame the EU in a more pragmatic way (Bücker 
2012, pp 43, 283). 
73 The value map by Inglehart and Menzel supports this presumption (see appendix). 
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to the EU (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Christin 2008, pp 34 ff.). Thus, the preferred political entity 
for decision-making can be identified. The evaluation of national institutions is hence crucial 
for the acceptance or rejection of the EU. The political opportunity cost model argues that 
there is a negative relationship between national and EU institutions describing a so-called 
zero-sum-game: the better the citizens evaluate their national system, the more probable that 
they devalue EU institutions – and vice versa74. Also, psychological contrast theory explains 
this relationship - in an even more extreme manner. It states that the nation-state serves as a 
contrast point against which the EU is evaluated. The psychological contrast effect even rein-
forces the positive/negative evaluation of the EU (Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 
105 ff.).  
There is also a counter thesis: the shortcut model assumes a positive relationship between atti-
tudes towards the nation and the EU75. This model conveys that people create a direct shortcut 
between nation and the EU describing a ‘projection’ from national to European evaluation 
(Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Kritzinger 2003; Kumlin 2009; Allam & Goerres 2011). The indi-
vidual’s ‘choice’ of these two contradicting mechanisms of evaluation relies very much on the 
individual’s conception of how close the national entities are associated with European ones.  
Nevertheless, studies show that the negative relationship between national and European 
evaluation is more likely in the political realm76. Thus, the political opportunity cost model 
serves as a theoretical backdrop of this work’s research question concerning the political enti-
ty of the EU. There are several possibilities to evaluate the performance of political entities. 
For instance, Sanchez-Cuenca uses national corruption as indicator for EU-support77 
(Sanchez-Cuenca 2000).  Christin shows another convincing operationalisation: the evalua-
tion of governance quality seems very promising and is hence used in the study at hand 
(Christin 2008, pp 55, 62 ff., 76). 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Christin describes this mechanism as follows: “the worse the opinion of the national political system and the 
better the opinion of the European political system, the lower the opportunity cost of transferring authority to the 
European political system” (Christin 2008, p 35).  
75 Boomgarden found that the more intense the attachment to the nation-state, the stronger the individual’s EU-
identity. This supports the shortcut model. This result is only conducted for the Netherlands but points to the 
complex relationship between national-state and EU (Boomgaarden et al. 2011). 
76 Kritzinger shows that a positive relationship between national and EU-attitude is observed in the economic 
sphere and a negative one in the political sphere.. This means that attitudes towards the nation are partly 
‘projected’ and partly reversed into a ‘zero-sum-game’ depending on the sphere and nationality (Kritzinger 2003, 
p 236). 
77 operationalized as ‘desired rhythm of integration’ 
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The evaluation of national political institutions serves as a contrast point for the 
attitude towards the EU. According to the political opportunity cost model, a neg-
ative relationship between the evaluation of national governance quality and the 
attitude towards the EU is expected.  
 
Mau shows that citizens of Mediterranean countries usually support social welfare programs 
on European level, whereas Scandinavian citizens are their strongest opponents (Mau 2005). 
He also explains this finding with the political opportunity cost model: due to generous wel-
fare regimes in Scandinavian countries, their citizens perceive the EU welfare program as step 
backwards - and vice versa for Mediterranean countries. According to literature and the logic 
of the presented explanatory model, we expect that EU-attitudes depend on the welfare re-
gime type78.  
 
3.3.3 National identity type 
 
Literature points to the importance of national identity as predictor for EU-attitude (see ch. 
2.1.3). As previously mentioned, identity is a very abstract, nuanced and sensitive issue that is 
difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, the following examinations will work on a dualistic concept 
of national identity types.  
The ability to identify with a transnational entity depends on the country’s identity type: be-
cause it affects the emergence of multiple identities (Carey 2002). Basically, there are numer-
ous models of multiple identities in literature. For instance, the “marble cake” model whose 
identities are highly intertwined and difficult to separate from each other. On the other hand, 
the model of “nested identities” assumes a hierarchy79 of multiple identities (Risse-Kappen 
2010, p 45). The study at hand accepts this hierarchical model due to the unequal relationship 
of national and EU identity: citizens usually identify with their nation – at least to some ex-
tent. Additionally, the identification with the transnational entity might occur whereas the na-
tional identity usually remains predominant80. 
In order not to overload this section, only the dualistic concept of civic and ethnic national 
identity is presented (see table 2). In literature, the concept of civic identity is very common 
                                                 
78 A noteworthy qualification of the political opportunity cost model is that it better explains EU-support than 
EU-identification. 
79 The model of nested identities is also known as ‘Russian Matryoshka doll model’ or ‘onion model’. The 
hierarchy is incorporated in the older versions of the Eurobarometer. One item asks with which political entity 
(city, country, EU) the interviewee identifies with firstly and secondly (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 45). 
80 Also regional identities are partly predominant but too complex to incorporate in this study (Carey 2002). 
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The national identity type determines the probability whether citizens exhibit mul-
tiple identities. A civic national identity makes it more probable to hold multiple 
identities, and hence, increase the probability of EU-identification. This leads to 
higher shares of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ and ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’. The ethnic national 
identity hampers EU-identification. This leads to higher shares of ‘EU-
Pragmatics’ and ’EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’83. 
 
There is not one well tested way to identify whether a civic or ethnic national identity is pre-
dominant84. Inconsistent results of this research field reflect this issue (e.g. Allam & Goerres 
2011; Christin 2008, pp 70, 89; Roose 2010b, p 139). Ethnic identity is measured as the citi-
zens’ fear to lose their national identity. Another operationalisation used in this study (see ch. 
5.5).is presented by Haller who analyses the citizens’ pride of being a member of their nation 
(Haller 2009, p 306). 
 
4 Methods and data 
 
In the following section, I position this study within the research landscape. Chapter 4.2 pre-
sents the derivation and elaboration of hypotheses and chapter 4.3 gives information on da-
taset, research units, and operationalisation. 
 
4.1 Positioning in research field 
 
Previous research and theoretical perspectives (see ch. 2 and 3) serve as a backdrop to posi-
tion this work within the present scientific landscape. Therefore, the following points describe 
this study’s classification. 
• The comparative research design highlights country differences. 
• Interdisciplinary approaches incorporate perspectives of sociology, social psychology, 
and political science. This accounts for the explorative character of the research at-
tempt. This leads to an eclectic theoretical backdrop which implies advantages (open-
ness, synergies) and shortcomings (accuracy, consistency).  
                                                 
83 Noteworthy is the limitation that this variable better explains EU-identification than EU-support. 
84 Another approach is shown by Fuchs and Schneider who present a 2x2 matrix of ideal types including multiple 
identity (national and European), national identity, European identity, and no identity (Fuchs & Klingemann 
2011, p 80). Unfortunately, the authors did not show the shares for single countries.  
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• The theoretical ‘backbone’ is the institutionalist perspective. Thus, the macro level and 
top-town effects play a primary role (e.g. due to national media, values, institutions, 
public debates, collective narratives, which form a unique public frame of the EU).  
• National contexts serve as a ‘moderating’ framework and affect the link between indi-
vidual attributes and EU-attitude. Three potential explanatory models are presented in 
chapter 3.3. The operationalisation of these national institutions is nevertheless based 
on aggregated individual data due to data availability and the assumption that EU-
attitude originates on micro level (cf. actor-centred institutionalism). 
• The research design’s basic method is the development and the ‘mapping’ of ideal 
types. 
• During the preliminary research process, inductive and deductive logics have been ap-
plied. The actual scientific method of this research design is deductive reasoning. 
• The aim of this work is i) the descriptive ‘mapping’ of national EU-attitude, ii) the 
verification/falsification of hypotheses using the membership duration as ‘socialisa-
tion’ variable (cf. 4.2) and iii) the evaluation of potential explanatory variables on 
macro level.   
• Although the results show quantitative data, the work’s capability for qualitative in-
terpretation is essential. 
 
This overview demonstrates that this study does not follow a scientific ‘tradition’ but com-
bines several ideas of current literature. This decision does not necessarily lead to a ‘smooth’ 
research design and incorporates several shortcomings. I argue that the research design never-
theless provides a pragmatic and synergetic way of proceeding which accounts for severe re-
search gaps in this scientific realm. 
 
4.2 Research design and hypotheses 
 
Many scholars regard a common EU-identification as precondition for EU-support.  Hence, 
EU-support is assumed to be unidirectionally dependent on EU-identification85. This means 
that EU-identification works as a sufficient and - depending on the literature - partly necessary 
condition for EU-support86. However, there is no verified empirical evidence of this strong 
                                                 
85 e.g. Mau (2005); Fuchs & Klingemann (2011); Christin (2008); Lucarelli (2011); Easton (1965) 
86 Christin (2008); Easton (1965); Fuchs & Klingemann (2011); Lucarelli (2011); Easton (1965); Mau (2005) 
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relationship (Carey 2002, p 390).  
I assume that EU-identification and EU-support emerge independently from each other, and 
exhibit weak equal and mutual influence. Consequently, this rather loose relationship can be 
described in a matrix of high/low EU-identification and high/low EU-support. Table 4 visual-
izes this pattern in a 2x2 matrix87. It shows four cells of citizens’ ideal-typical EU-attitudes: i) 
‘EU-Enthusiasts’, ii) ‘EU-Pragmatics’, iii) ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’, and iv) ‘EU-
Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’. 
 
Table 4: Matrix of four ideal-typical EU-attitudes 
 
EU-Support 
 strong  weak 
EU-Identification 
strong  EU-Enthusiasts   Sceptical EU-Idealists 
weak  EU-Pragmatics   EU-Opponents/EU-Non-affected  
Source: own presentation 
 
These ideal types have not yet been introduced in this way. Only two ‘mainstream’ types, i.e. 
‘EU-Enthusiasts’ and ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’, are identified in previous research. 
The ‘mixed’ cells show the neglected ideal types ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ and ‘EU-
Pragmatics’. I argue that these ‘mixed’ individual patterns provide essential insight into the 
characteristics of the national EU-attitude and point to the type of public EU-framing88. Since 
‘EU-Enthusiasts’ and ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’ are present in literature I abstain 
from a detailed description and focus on the two ‘mixed’ ideal types that require explanation. 
 
Sceptical EU-Idealists 
‘Sceptical EU-Idealists’ do identify themselves with the principles of the EU, but 
at the same time, they are critical of its actions and, thus, do not support them. 
Concerning the hypotheses (see below), Risse-Kappen introduces the independent 
variable ‘membership duration’. He assumes that the population of ‘old’ member 
states feel closer to European ideals and identify with them due to a longer social-
isation process (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 46). At the same time, these ideal-typical 
citizens perceive EU policy as a step backwards because of their relatively high 
                                                 
87 Caiani and Ferrer-Fons present a role-model for this visualisation; their matrix applies to a research question 
directed to civil society (Maloney 2010). 
88 (cf. Bücker 2012) 
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national economic well-being89 (cf. political opportunity cost model in ch. 3.3.2) 
and idealistic standards. Thus, these citizens do indeed identify with the EU but 
they do not support its actions which leads to this ‘mixed’ ideal-typical pattern of 
‘sceptical EU-Idealists’. 
Another perspective supports this hypothesis: the way the EU’s top-down sociali-
sation differs between ‘West’ and ‘East’ (Karolewski 2011, p 952). Through this, 
two ‘kinds’ of EU-attitude are initiated. In - tentatively ‘old’ - ‘Western’ member 
states, socialisation is directed to an emotional attachment fostering EU-
identification an idealistic EU-framing. 
 
EU-Pragmatics 
In contrast, ‘EU-Pragmatics’ support EU-policy but do not identify with it. Con-
cerning the hypotheses, the short socialisation period of ‘new’ members’ foster 
this pattern. The shorter socialisation period leads to less contact occasions 
(Forbes 1997, p 9 f.) and weaker internalisation of European ideals and, thus, less 
identification with the EU (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 184; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000, p 
168). At the same time, the ideal-typical citizens rather support EU policy because 
they perceive personal and collective economic advantages90. This strengthens the 
‘mixed’ ideal-type of ‘EU-Pragmatics’.  
Another perspective supports this thesis: as aforementioned, the EU’s top-down 
socialisation differs between ‘West’ and ‘East’ (Karolewski 2011, p 952). An 
“identity light version” is promoted in – tentatively ‘new’ - ‘Eastern’ member 
states. This socialisation method works with the cost-benefit approach by grants 
and sanctions. In this way, Karolewski claims that the EU has instilled the charac-
ter of ‘Eastern’ EU-attitude which is based on pragmatic evaluations of the politi-
cal-economic sphere91. This fosters rational EU-framing and EU-support – pro-
vided that the target objects’ actions are advantageous. 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 cf. figures on GDP measures (Eurostat 2013) 
90 Actually this perception depends on the country’s stance within European economy. Due to comprehensibility 
and in favour of clear-cut hypotheses, it assumed that EU policy is advantageous for ‘new’ member states and 
their citizens. 
91 The promotion of European identity is discussed in chapter 6.1 on political implications. 
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Two dimensions of EU-framing were elaborated in section 3.2.2: the ‘rational’ and ‘emotion-
al’ dimension. They reflect two ideal typical perspectives how people ‘frame’ the EU. Turning 
again to the hypotheses, I present the following mechanisms based on expected outcomes. 
 
Emotional dimension 
In ‘old’ member states, idealistic and emotional top-down socialisation fosters a 
positive EU-identification in the emotional dimension. Also, the longer the period 
of potential interpersonal contact with other Europeans has a positive impact on 
emotional EU-support92 (cf. operationalisation in ch. 4.3) (Forbes 1997, p 9 f.). 
Consequently, ‘old’ member states show a higher share of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the 
emotional dimension in comparison to the rational one.  
 
Rational dimension 
The EU’s rationalized socialisation strategy in ‘new’ members-states focuses on 
economic issues and installs cost-benefit rationalities linked with the EU. This is 
due to the target object of the rational dimension being political-economic entities 
and their policy. This liberal economic policy is assumed to be perceived as rather 
advantageous in ‘new’ member states93. Consequently, ‘new’ member states show 
a higher share of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the rational dimension in comparison to the 
emotional one. 
 
These elaborations lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: ‘Old’ member states feature a relatively high share of ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ 
compared to the remaining ideal types. 
 
H2: ‘New’ member states show a relatively high share of ‘EU-Pragmatics’ com-
pared to remaining ideal types. 
 
H3: ‘Old’ member states show a higher share of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the emotional 
dimension compared to the rational one. 
                                                 
92 Since the target object of this emotional sphere is the European community, these interaction occasions are a 
crucial precondition for this mechanism. 
93 This assumption abstracts from actual figures but allows a comprehensible research design and elaboration of 
clear-cut hypotheses. 
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H4: ‘New’ member states show a higher share of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the rational 
dimension compared to the emotional one. 
 
In order to point to relevant future research, two additional issues are tackled to a limited de-
gree. Firstly, country clusters are suggested on base of qualitative and quantitative findings 
(see ch. 5.4). Secondly, the three explanatory approaches are evaluated on base of macro level 
figures (see ch. 5.5).  
 
4.3 Dataset and operationalisation 
 
None of the surveys in question94 considers all relevant variables. Thus, the decision for a 
dataset has proved problematic. The Eurobarometer 77.3 (May 2012) offers the most satisfy-
ing items with regard to theoretical aspiration and current data. It was established as “a bi-
annual public opinion survey […] in all member states of the European Union on behalf of the 
European Commission” (GESIS 2013)95. However, two general problems arise: firstly, the 
Eurobarometer is mandated by the European commission - questioning the objectivity of this 
poll since it might be used as political tool96 (Haller 2009, pp 358 f.). Secondly, the interview-
ees’ answers are based on cultural-specific understanding and interpretation; hence, nationally 
biased answers might occur; also, restrictions through translation inconsistencies might distort 
results.  
The unit of analysis is split in two layers: the macro level is reflected by the EU-27 member 
states97 including a split-up of Germany West and Germany East. Thus, the results for two 
EU-framing dimensions encompass 56 matrices of national ideal type shares. The micro level 
includes individuals who live in the EU-27 countries as nationals and are older than 18 years. 
Migrants without citizenship of the destination country are excluded from analysis due to the 
possibility of biasing the results98. In total, replies of n=25.691 individuals were analysed with 
                                                 
94 such as EVS, Eurobarometer, ESS, ISSP, etc. 
95 “The standard Eurobarometer was established in 1973” and “[e]ach survey consists in approximately 1000 
face-to-face interviews per Member State (except Germany: 1500, Luxembourg: 600, United Kingdom 1300 
including 300 in Northern Ireland)”. It is “[c]onducted between 2 and 5 times per year, with reports published 
twice yearly” (DG Communication 1995-2012). 
96 For instance, an unbalanced enquiry strategy supports this suspicion, such as leaving out questions on 
problematic issues on bureaucracy and corruption. 
97 Croatia (accession in July 2013) is excluded since the used wave of the member state questionnaire does not 
include this country. 
98 In future studies, it might be promising to analyse migrants of the first and second generation since they are 
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the statistics program SPSS 21.0.  
With respect to operationalisation, EU-identification and EU-support are fragile constructs 
and a “daunting task” (Risse-Kappen 2010, pp 33 ff.): a crucial difficulty of measurement 
validity is to distinguish between “identities, role playing, [and] interests”. Several scholars 
problematize the measurement of European identification/identity and support99. Unfortunate-
ly, it seems that no study has yet been conducted which tries to systematize operationalisa-
tions with regard to target objects, retrieval modes, framing dimensions, etc.  
EU-identification and EU-support are latent constructs that cannot be measured directly 
(Schnell, Hill & Esser 2008, p 147). After considering numerous items and indices in prelimi-
nary investigation, it proves pragmatic to use a simple operationalisation. This decision facili-
tates the results’ interpretation and evaluation of validity.  
A limitation is that the chosen items cannot live up to theoretical aspirations. Nevertheless, 
they provide justifiable validity. Moreover, their statistical quality is quite high considering 
applicability of response scales, number of cases, and standard deviations100. It is notable that 
one concept ‘matches’ one dimension. The emotional dimension captures EU-identification 
more adequately while the rational dimension provides better explanation for EU-support. 
In the following table, the operationalisation of EU-identification and EU-support is presented 
by rational and emotional dimension (overview see table 5). These operationalisations are 
suggestions which surely require further testing and improvement. 
 
Table 5: Operationalisation of EU-identification and EU-support by rational and emotional dimension 
Source: own presentation 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘fresh’ objects of the socialisation process. Also, the differentiation between EU-migrants and non-EU migrants 
might provide fruitful insights. 
99 e.g. Boomgaarden et al. (2011); Bücker (2012); Christin (2008); Delhey, Newton & Welzel (2011); Fuchs & 
Klingemann (2011); Sinnott (2005) 
100 Some ‘popular’ item such as “EU is a good/bad thing” were excluded due to these quality standards. 
  EU-Identification EU-Support 
Rational dimension 
[Statement:] You feel you are 
a citizen of the EU.  
 
A European economic and 
monetary union with one single 
currency, the euro 
Emotional dimension 
Please tell me how attached 
you feel to… 
The European Union 
When compared to other 
continents, it is much easier 
to see what Europeans have 
in common in terms of values 
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EU-identification  
As aforementioned, the rational dimension is difficult to capture. According to the dualistic 
concept of EU-framing (see ch. 3.2.2), the civic ‘identification’ is retrieved by the “central 
route” and includes an evaluative and information-based perspective on political entities. 
Identifying oneself as part of a political entity is reflected by the evaluation of the statement: 
“You feel you are a citizen of the EU”. This variable shows a four-point scale refraining from 
an ‘intermediate answer’.  The self-attribution as EU-citizen reflects the cognitive acceptance 
of political rationalities and principles as part of the individual’s (role-)identity (Habermas 
2001; Nullmeier 2000, pp 269 ff.). 
The emotional dimension is easier to grasp. This dimension’s affective retrieval pleads for the 
item “Please tell me how attached you feel to… The European Union”. Although one can crit-
icise that the wording how somebody does “feel” rather refers to affective retrieval. I argue 
that i) it focuses on a rather rational and political perspective through the term “citizen”,  ii) 
compared to alternative items, the methodological arguments overweigh this content-wise 
shortcoming, and iii) there is still a sufficient contrast to the emotional dimension’s item. This 
variable also shows a four-point scale refraining from an ‘intermediate answer’. Through this, 
the split-up in two groups of ‘high’ and ‘low’ EU-identification is facilitated. 
 
Rational dimension: QD3_1 
The literal question is: “For each of the following statements, please tell me to 
what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. You feel you are a citizen 
of the EU”.  
o The ordinal four-point Likert scale reaches from 1: “Yes, definitely” to 4: 
“No, definitely not”; (5: “Don’t know”)  
o Descriptives: mean = 2.33, std= .919; the variable split is: high identifica-
tion 1-2; low identification 3-4 
 
Emotional dimension: QD2_3  
The literal question is: “Please tell me how attached you feel to… The European 
Union”.  
o The ordinal four-point Likert scale reaches from 1: “Very attached” to 4: 
“Not attached at all”; (5: “Don’t know”) 
o Descriptives: mean = 2.60, std= .849; the variable split is: high identifica-
tion 1-2; low identification 3-4 
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EU-support 
The rational dimension is conceptually easier to apply: specific support is based on evaluative 
orientation towards political institutions and their policy. It is retrieved by the “central route” 
whose evaluations are information-based and purposive-rationally motivated. Closeness to the 
economic-political sphere is decisive. For this reason, the approval of the statement “A Euro-
pean economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro” is chosen101. This 
scope of EU policy is crucial for its evaluation as conceptualized in chapter 3.2.2.  
EU-support is difficult to measure in the emotional dimension. The operationalisation of long-
term, diffuse support is the most problematic one: it is hard to grasp by affective retrieval 
since support is mostly based on purposive-rational motivation. In order to fulfil this aspira-
tion, the following item is chosen: “When compared to other continents, it is much easier to 
see what Europeans have in common in terms of values”102.  By this, value-rational motives 
that reflect long-term commitment towards the target object of the European community are 
involved. A severe problem of the wording is obvious: it is unclear whether this item 
measures the degree of cohesion – which is the actual aim – or rather the degree of dissocia-
tion from non-Europeans. This differentiation depends on the individual framing which can-
not adequately be tested by this dataset. Another shortcoming is that the target object of this 
question does not match the respective identification item in the rational dimension: it does 
not ask for the EU but Europe as continent and its ‘ethnic’ Europeans. This hampers the di-
mensions’ comparison. However, this operationalisation reflects the socio-cultural sphere 
quite well and takes the degree of perceived similarities into account (Fuchs & Klingemann 
2011, pp 37 f.)103. 
 
 
                                                 
101 This item is problematic due to its heterogeneous perceptions depending on the country. The answers  might 
be heavily influenced by the fact whether a citizen’s nation-state is a net-recipient of the European redistribution 
process. Nevertheless, it is one of the most meaningful items and a good proxy to measure EU-support (Allam & 
Goerres 2011).  
An optional operationalisation is shown by Sanchez-Cuenca who applies the “desired rhythm of integration” 
which reflects the approval of enlargement policy; however, this construct contains the problem of 
heterogeneous framing possibilities (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). 
The item “Do you trust/support [institution]” is not applied since it lies in between the rational and emotional 
dimension. 
102 An optional item is “EU membership is a good thing” which reflects the emotional dimension quite well. 
Although often used in literature (Mau 2005; Carey 2002, pp 390 f.), this operationalisation is not suited for this 
research design. Unfortunately, it does not reflect the socio-cultural sphere and, above that, it is a five-point scale 
that offers an ‘intermediate’ answer that is chosen by many respondents. 
103 Of course, it is still arguable whether these similarities are needed. Nevertheless, this work regards the 
perceived closeness as proxy for perceived cohesion and approval of the ‘socio-cultural’ project. 
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Rational dimension: QA19_1 
The literal question is: “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? 
Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.  A European 
economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro”. 
o The answers are 1: “For” and 2: “Against”; (3: “Don’t know”) 
o Descriptives: “For”: 56.3%; the variable split is: 1=high support; 2=low 
support 
 
Emotional dimension: QE1_9 
The literal question is: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements? When compared to other continents, it is much easier to see 
what Europeans have in common in terms of values”.  
o The ordinal four-point Likert scale reaches from 1: “Totally agree” to 4: 
“Totally disagree”; (5: “Don’t know”) 
o Descriptives: mean = 2.23 , std= .76; the variable split is: 1 – 2 = high 
support; 3 – 4 = low support 
 
‘EU-Alienated’ and ‘EU-Out-group’: adaption of the emotional dimension  
The emotional dimension’s titles of ideal types require adaption to operationalisation re-
strictions. This adjustment concerns the two ‘mixed’ ideal types: high emotional identification 
combined with low support is interpreted as the ideal type ‘EU-Alienated’. These citizens feel 
attached to the EU but generally dissociate themselves from the European community104. The 
hypothetical explanation is that these citizens think that their national and cultural background 
does indeed represent Europe’s ‘core values’ but they do not perceive that the remaining Eu-
ropean community is close to these principles.  
The ideal type ‘EU-Out-group’ shows low emotional identification and strong support of the 
European community. These citizens believe in the European community’s cultural cohesion 
but do not feel part of it. These citizens perceive themselves as European ‘outsiders’. Various 
reasons are possible: geographical distance, feeling superior or inferior towards other Europe-
ans, strong national pride or the feeling of not being accepted by ‘core’ Europeans105. 
 
                                                 
104 A severe problem remains this item’s ambiguity whether it measures the degree of cohesion or rather the 
degree of dissociation from non-Europeans. 
105 Delhey (2007) 
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Rational dimension 
  EU-Support 
high low 
EU-Identification 
high EU-Enthusiasts % Sceptical EU-Idealists % 
low EU-Pragmatics % EU-Opponents/ Non-affected % 
 
 
Emotional dimension 
  EU-Support 
high low 
EU-Identification 
high EU-Enthusiasts % EU-Alienated % 
low EU-Out-group % EU-Opponents/ Non-affected % 
 
 
This work’s aim of testing most different EU-framings reflects the explorative research de-
sign. It intends to reveal diverging results depending on the applied EU-framing. Neverthe-
less, it comprises a shortcoming: the presented dimensions’ operationalisation relates to vari-
ous dualistic elements (see table 3) which vary by dimension - be it the retrieval mode, the 
target object, or the socio-economic sphere, among others. The direct comparison of the emo-
tional and rational dimension proves problematic: statistical differences cannot be assigned to 
one single element which makes the detection of causal elements impossible.  
 
5  Results 
 
This chapter only presents main findings. The appendix shows detailed results including the 
single countries’ socio-demographic descriptives, means, and standard deviations. Although 
the following paragraph’s wording often refers to ‘member states’ or ‘countries’, the unit of 
analysis is the micro level; the individuals’ data is merely aggregated to the macro level.  
All results are computed with respective weighting variables106 accounting for the compara-
tive research design. Great Britain and Northern Ireland are merged into United Kingdom107. 
                                                 
106 The Eurobarometer provides the weighting variables “w1” to analyse countries comparatively and “w22” to 
account for the country’s relative population size when computing results for all countries (Moschner 2013). 
107 However, the used Eurobarometer’s abbreviation does not change. The abbreviation “GB” is used although 
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West Germany and the former East Germany are analysed separately due to diverging results 
and discrepancy of accession years.  
The tables below show country abbreviations that are used throughout this chapter. The tables’ 
country order corresponds to the member states’ accession years. Consequently, the sequence 
visualizes the independent variable of the hypotheses: the duration of EU-membership. ‘Old’ 
member states with long socialisation period are at the top and ‘new’ member states at the 
bottom of the tables.  
All countries that have accessed the EU before 1986 are defined as ‘old’ members and the 
countries that joined later are defined as ‘new’ members108. Accordingly, the 28 countries 
(including the former East Germany) are split in two even groups. The term ‘core countries’ 
defines the six original member states109 in the following section. 
 
5.1 Overview of EU-identification and EU-support by dimension 
 
Table 6 shows the countries’ shares of citizens who exhibit high EU-identification and high 
EU-support (split-up defined in ch. 4.3) by rational and emotional dimension.  
Generally, the shares are surprisingly high and vary enormously depending on item and coun-
try. Noteworthy are the ranges of rational and emotional identification: while a strong rational 
identification as civic citizen shows a rather narrow range of shares (42.6% – 77.8%), the 
emotional attachment to the EU varies remarkably among countries (26.6% – 71.6%)110. Be-
yond that, rational and emotional identification differs enormously within some countries. In 
Finland, civic identification is high whereas the emotional attachment is very low. In Latvia 
and Bulgaria this pattern is reversed. These findings call for more intense and qualitative ex-
amination of EU-identification ‘types’. The research field’s ‘familiar’ ‘EU-sympathisers’ (FR, 
BE, DE-W, LU) and ‘EU-objectors’ (GB, GR, FI, SW) do not feature the expected clear-cut 
results. In particular, FR, NL, DE-W, PT, FI, GR, HU, and BG are very ambivalent cases 
which require further examination. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Northern Ireland is included and not part of Great Britain. 
108 The split-up is made upon the decision to work with two equally sized groups; furthermore, the period 
between accessions of DE-E and FI is 5 years which is quite a reasonable duration. 
‚Old‘ members are FR BE NL DE-W IT LU DK IE GB GR ES PT DE-E; 
‚new‘ members are FI SE AT CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SL BG RO. 
109 ‘core’ members: FR BE NL DE-W IT LU 
110 See appendix for means and standard deviations. 
 49
Table 6: Country shares of strong EU-identification/EU-support by dimension  
 
 
Source: own presentation 
 
 
 
High identification: 
feel to be EU citizen
High support: 
Economic 
Union
High identification: 
Attachment to EU
High support: 
Europeans 
common values
FR - France 66,2% 71,6% 55,7% 67,0%
BE - Belgium 69,7% 76,3% 58,0% 69,2%
NL - The Netherlands 61,1% 73,5% 35,8% 52,4%
DE-W - Germany West 77,8% 69,7% 55,6% 65,2%
IT - Italy 44,9% 61,4% 44,9% 66,2%
LU - Luxembourg 84,6% 80,2% 71,6% 75,5%
DK - Denmark 74,5% 28,9% 43,5% 58,3%
IE - Ireland 70,0% 85,3% 45,4% 72,2%
GB - UNITED KINGDOM 42,6% 16,6% 26,6% 64,3%
GR - Greece 49,6% 78,1% 35,9% 76,1%
ES -Spain 69,9% 59,5% 47,7% 78,3%
PT - Portugal 59,7% 62,7% 41,9% 76,7%
DE-E - Germany East 60,8% 60,8% 43,5% 63,5%
FI - Finland 70,6% 75,4% 32,9% 78,2%
SE - Sweden 65,0% 27,3% 38,9% 55,9%
AT - Austria 60,3% 68,6% 40,8% 68,1%
CY - Cyprus (Republic) 61,5% 54,0% 33,4% 86,1%
CZ - Czech Republic 53,0% 25,1% 38,5% 68,6%
EE - Estonia 66,5% 74,0% 43,6% 76,2%
HU - Hungary 51,2% 51,6% 46,2% 65,5%
LV - Latvia 54,1% 40,5% 54,6% 75,5%
LT - Lithuania 59,5% 46,6% 34,6% 79,9%
MT - Malta 72,0% 64,1% 49,5% 74,5%
PL - Poland 71,6% 37,9% 63,9% 82,6%
SK - Slovakia 69,8% 83,0% 50,0% 79,0%
SI - Slovenia 65,8% 82,5% 44,5% 68,1%
BG - Bulgaria 49,2% 61,9% 54,3% 81,7%
RO - Romania 62,1% 72,7% 55,7% 77,0%
Rational dimension Emotional dimension
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In order to compare the shares in a relative way among countries, three symbols are added 
column-wise. They display the country shares’ assignment to the tertiles111 of high (green), 
intermediate (yellow) and low (red)112 EU-identification/EU-support compared to all coun-
tries. At first sight, we notice a very ‘colourful’ table. Turning to the wide-spread assumption 
that support is strongly dependent on identification, one expects the same colour in every row. 
This would show that EU-identification and EU-support are ‘on the same level’ and depend-
ent from each other. This is obviously not the case. The findings support this work’s basic 
assumption of the constructs’ independence of one another.  
These deliberations lead to the statistical relationship between nationality and EU-attitude. 
Depending on the item’s scale of measurement, Eta2 or phi is applied113. All results are highly 
significant at the 1% level and show that nationality explains 4.8% of the derivation of ration-
al identification, 3.5% of emotional identification, and only 2.2% of emotional support114. 
Thus, nationality has an intermediate impact on these items and shows a stronger impact in 
the rational dimension.  
When analysing the relationship between EU-identification and EU-support, it is notable that 
they are generally weaker than expected in literature115. The correlation between EU-
identification and EU-support is 0.268 (spearman116) in the emotional dimension and 0.368 
(phi) in the rational dimension (significant at the 1% significance level). Interestingly, these 
correlations differ enormously among countries117 (see appendix). With regard to the inde-
pendent variable ‘membership duration’, no typical pattern of ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states 
is identified.  
Since the hypotheses refer to the ideal typical EU-attitudes, this table mainly serves as a start-
ing point; only first impressions shall be noted. Hypothesis H1 claims that ‘old’ members 
show a relatively strong EU- identification. This means that the identification items are ex-
pected to be green at the top and turn into yellow and red at the end of the table. This predict-
                                                 
111 Tertiles describe the countries’ split-up in three even groups. 
112 The colours do not imply any evaluation. 
113 Phi is used to account for the dichotomous support item of the rational dimension.  All other items are four-
point ordinal scales. Although a metric scale is desirable for Eta2, it is applied to estimate the relationship 
between the nationality’s nominal scale and the three ordinal items. 
114 Eta2 and phi cannot be compared (results of phi: see appendix). 
115 Noteworthy is the spearman correlation of 0.657 between rational and emotional identification. Although 
quite a strong relationship, it is surprising that this indicator is not even higher. The variation among countries is 
impressive: In some countries this relationship is extremely high (e.g. ML) and in others rather low (e.g. LV, 
SW). These figures call for further examination, especially with regard to national pride. 
116 Since this work assumes that variables do not show a causal direction, symmetric indicators are used. 
117 In the rational dimension, BE, FR, LU, GR, ES, AU, CY, SK, BG, DE-E show a strong correlation; DK, GB, 
FI, EE, LV, LT, RO show a weak one.  
In the emotional sphere, the correlation is strong in GR, ML, PL, BG, DE-W; it is weak in DK, FI, HU, LU, DK, 
NE, RO, SW.  
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ed pattern is cannot be observed since both dimensions remain too ‘colourful’ to evaluate the 
hypothesis reasonably. Hypothesis H2 claims that ‘new’ members show relatively strong EU-
support. This means that support items shall be red at the top and turn into yellow and green at 
the end of the table. This pattern can tentatively be identified in the emotional dimension. 
According to the hypotheses H3 and H4, we expect that ‘old’ members show relatively high 
shares in the emotional dimension compared to the rational one - and ‘new’ member states 
vice versa. However, the results point to a rejection of these hypotheses. 
 
Generally, the relationship between EU-identification and EU-support is weaker 
than literature suggests. The research field’s ‘familiar’ ‘EU-sympathisers’ and 
‘EU-objectors’ do not show the expected results.  
 
5.2 Ideal type matrices 
 
The ideal type matrices are this work’s core result and show the four ideal typical EU-
attitudes by country and dimension. Since visualisation of 56 matrices is too extensive, they 
are found in the appendix. The following tables show the ideal type shares among all coun-
tries by rational and emotional dimension: 
All countries: rational dimension 
  EU-Support 
high low 
EU-Identification 
high 42.6% 19.1%
low 13.7% 24.6%
 
 b 
All countries: emotional dimension 
  
EU-Support 
high low 
EU-Identification 
high 38.9% 10.2%
low 30.3% 20.6%
 
The two ‘mainstream’ ideal types ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ and ‘EU-Opponents’ are generally prevail-
ing. It is noteworthy that the share of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ is surprisingly high in the rational di-
mension (42.6%). The ‘mixed’ ideal types are nevertheless relevant by representing 32.8% of 
the European population in the rational dimension and 40.5% in the emotional dimension. The 
emotional dimension’s share of ‘EU-Out-group’ is particularly strong.  
As aforementioned, this work cannot present all matrices. A short summary of the country-
specific results is therefore given by each dimension. In the rational dimension, the major 
ideal type among all countries are ‘EU-Enthusiasts’. There are two exceptions among ‘old’ 
member states: in DK, ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’, and in GB, ‘EU-Opponents’ are the major 
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group. The ‘new’ members’ exceptions are SE and PL whose main ideal type are the ‘sceptical 
EU-Idealists’; in CZ and LV, ‘EU-Opponents’ form the majority. Generally, ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
members show quite a similar pattern with regard to absolute figures.  
The emotional dimension’s major group are also ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ (38.9%). Nevertheless, sev-
eral exceptions are found among ‘old’ member states: in DK, GB, and GR, the ‘EU-Out-
group’ type is strongest, whereas in NL the ‘EU-Opponents/Non-affected’ type is prevailing. 
These findings show that the emotional dimension is more heterogeneous than the rational 
one. Generally, some nationalities show an extremely negative EU-attitude in the emotional 
dimension. It is striking that ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ are the dominant ideal type in ‘new’ member 
states. Nevertheless, many exceptions are observed: in FI, CY, CZ, and LT, the ‘EU-Out-
group’ is strongest. In SE, ‘EU-Opponents’ form the major group. With regard to the inde-
pendent variable ‘duration of membership’, there are two country groups among ‘new’ mem-
bers: the ‘newest’ members’ citizens (LV, MT, PL, SK, BG, RO) tentatively feel as part of the 
European community; and the citizens of the remaining ’new’ countries whose citizens feel as 
European outsiders. 
 
Suggestions for case analyses 
One attempt of this work is to provide starting points for qualitative analysis of single coun-
try’s unique EU-attitude. These analyses potentially reveal crucial insights - in particular if 
transdisciplinary perspectives are applied. Since intense discussion of single countries goes 
beyond the scope of this work, two brief summaries of the exemplary cases of Finland and 
Poland are given in the following. These ad hoc interpretations serve as starting points of 
analysis by applying the combined findings of the rational and emotional dimension’s EU-
attitude. The following suggestions require further investigation. 
Finland’s citizens are mainly assigned to ideal-typical ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the rational dimen-
sion; whereas the ideal-type ‘EU-Out-group’ is dominant in the emotional dimension118. One 
can argue that the Finnish cherish the EU’s political-economic sphere; while they perceive the 
socio-cultural homogeneity of Europeans,  they do not feel attached to this community. Since 
bilateral trust towards Finland is high119 the feeling of being not accepted by ‘core’ countries 
                                                 
118 The Netherlands are quite similar but a different interpretation is reasonable. In the rational dimension, its 
citizens are ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ and, in the emotional dimension, most are ‘EU-Opponents’. It seems that the 
political-economic sphere is cherished by Dutch citizens. Simultaneously, they do not feel attached to Europe 
and its community. This can be due to a very pragmatic stance towards the EU - however accepting the role as 
‘political’ EU citizen. Another reason might be the strong national identity (cf. ch. 3.3.3 and 5.5): suggesting that 
it is of a rather ethnic type, it would not allow an additional ‘emotional’ attachment. 
119 Delhey (2007, p 269) 
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is excluded. One can interpret this stance as superior voluntary out-group – in contrast to 
‘new’ members who might feel ‘expelled’ by ‘core’ countries. Thus, geographical distance 
and strong national ethnic identity120 might hamper emotional attachment. 
A very interesting case is Poland whose citizens show the highest share of ‘sceptical EU-
Idealists’ in the rational sphere and ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the emotional one121. According to the 
literature, opposed results are expected. It is surprising that a rather ‘new’ member state with 
short socialisation period scores that high in the emotional dimension – and at the same time 
specific support remains low. In sum, Poland might be a case in point for several rather ‘new’ 
members that are very EU-enthusiastic. Nevertheless, explanations for these patterns remain 
open to question.  
 
5.3 Relative shares of ideal types  
 
Only the absolute shares of the ideal types have yet been analysed. In order to evaluate the 
hypotheses adequately, the following two tables compare to the member states’ ideal-type 
shares in a relative way. Therefore, three symbols are added (cf. ch. 5.1) indicating the rela-
tive strength of the country’s share among all member states. The symbols show to which 
tertile the country’s ideal type share is assigned to. The colours imply a relatively high 
(green), intermediate (yellow) or low (red) share of the given ideal type.  
 
Rational dimension 
Table 7 shows the ideal type shares of the rational dimension by country. We notice that these 
shares vary strongly. Nevertheless, every ideal type exhibits a certain level and range: the col-
umn of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ show the highest shares and the highest range, followed by ‘EU-
Opponents’, ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’, and ‘EU-Pragmatics’. 
According to hypothesis H1, we estimate that ‘old’ members feature a high share of ‘sceptical 
EU-Idealists’. Since the table is ordered by accession date starting with the ‘oldest’ members, 
                                                 
120 Referring to the item ‘pride to be citizen of [nation]’ (Finland: 47%, mean: 34%) (Haller 2009, p 306). 
121 It seems promising to combine all these findings with already conducted studies. For instance, Bücker 
analysed qualitatively EU-frames in Poland and former East Germany. According to the author, Polish citizens 
are more homogenous across all milieus due to similar public discourses; whereas a polarisation of former East 
German framing is observable. Furthermore, EU-support is restricted to higher status groups in former East 
Germany. In the Polish case, the “Western Value Community” frames the EU stressing the country’s European 
identity and the EU’s “modernisation” and “Protection and Power” frames. Also, the Polish EU-attitude is more 
pragmatic since they always rate specific consequences of membership (Bücker 2012, pp 281 ff.). Interestingly, 
this is not in line with this work’s findings claiming that this ‘pragmatic’ framing is rather uncommon among 
Polish citizens (only 4.2% of ‘EU-Pragmatics’ in the rational dimension). 
 54
the second column’s colours are expected to reach from green, through yellow, to red. This 
order cannot be verified: the core countries indeed show particularly low shares of ‘sceptical 
EU-Idealists’. Surprisingly, rather new member states as LV, LT, and PL show relatively high 
shares of ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ which contradicts H1. 
According to hypothesis H2, we expect ‘new’ member states to show a relatively high share 
of ‘EU-Pragmatics’. Consequently, the third column shall show red symbols at the top and 
green ones at the end. The actual figures neither affirm nor falsify H2 since there is no pattern 
identifiable. However, there is a tendency that some of the ‘old’ members (BE, NL, IT, IE, 
GR) and the three ‘newest’ EU-members (SL, BG, RO) show very high shares of ‘EU-
Pragmatics’. This finding simultaneously contradicts and slightly affirms H2. These very 
‘new’ member states’ citizens might not have had time to build up EU-identification; at the 
same time, they support the EU – possibly due to expected economic advantages. On the other 
hand, ‘old’ members obtain many ‘pragmatic’ individuals - which is an unexpected finding 
with regard to the long socialisation period. This finding may indicate that many of the ‘old’ 
members’ citizens ‘take the EU for granted’. This pragmatic ideal-type implies a ‘risky’ kind 
of EU-commitment (see ch. 6.1.). 
According to hypothesis H4, we expect ‘new’ members to show a relatively high share of 
‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the rational dimension compared to the emotional one. Again, this hy-
pothesis cannot be affirmed122. The ‘newest’ members are tentatively more EU-enthusiastic in 
the emotional dimension (LV, PL, SV, BG) which contradicts H4.  
 
  
                                                 
122 According to the interpretation of tertiles, only FI, CY, and SK are more enthusiastic in the rational 
dimension. 
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Table 7: Rational dimension’s relative shares of ideal typical EU-attitude by country  
 
 
Source: own presentation 
 
 
Emotional dimension 
Table 8 shows the ideal type shares of the emotional dimension. Again, they vary strongly 
among countries. But this time, the columns display more clear patterns. According to hy-
pothesis H1, we expect ‘old’ members to feature a high share of ‘EU-Alienated’. Especially 
EU-Enthusiasts Sceptical EU-Idealists EU-Pragmatics
EU-Opponents / 
Non-affected
FR - France 56,0% 10,3% 16,3% 17,3%
BE - Belgium 57,4% 12,7% 18,8% 11,0%
NL - The Netherlands 50,2% 11,2% 23,4% 15,2%
DE-W - Germany West 61,1% 17,6% 8,5% 12,7%
IT - Italy 35,6% 10,8% 26,0% 27,5%
LU - Luxembourg 71,5% 13,3% 8,5% 6,8%
DK - Denmark 25,3% 49,2% 3,7% 21,9%
IE - Ireland 64,5% 7,0% 20,5% 8,0%
GB - UNITED KINGDOM 11,5% 31,0% 5,2% 52,4%
GR - Greece 47,4% 4,0% 30,6% 18,0%
ES -Spain 50,9% 19,4% 8,6% 21,1%
PT - Portugal 46,0% 15,3% 16,6% 22,1%
DE-E - Germany East 46,9% 14,0% 14,4% 24,7%
FI - Finland 56,8% 14,3% 18,6% 10,3%
SE - Sweden 22,4% 42,2% 5,0% 30,4%
AT - Austria 52,2% 8,6% 16,4% 22,8%
CY - Cyprus (Republic) 42,5% 20,0% 11,6% 26,0%
CZ - Czech Republic 20,7% 31,7% 4,6% 43,1%
EE - Estonia 54,5% 13,0% 19,6% 13,0%
HU - Hungary 35,4% 17,4% 16,3% 30,9%
LV - Latvia 27,7% 26,5% 12,9% 32,9%
LT - Lithuania 33,3% 27,1% 13,3% 26,2%
MT - Malta 56,0% 16,6% 7,7% 19,7%
PL - Poland 34,4% 37,6% 4,2% 23,8%
SK - Slovakia 64,4% 6,5% 18,6% 10,5%
SI - Slovenia 59,3% 6,7% 23,2% 10,8%
BG - Bulgaria 39,6% 13,6% 22,4% 24,4%
RO - Romania 49,9% 15,0% 22,9% 12,2%
Rational dimension
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among the six ‘core’ countries, H1 is supported. 
With regard to hypothesis H2, we expect ‘new’ member states to show a relatively high share 
of the ideal type ‘EU-Out-group’. H2 cannot be verified: rather the ‘middle-aged’ countries 
seem to feel as ‘outsiders’. Many of these ‘outsider’ countries are commonly regarded as Eu-
rosceptic (e.g. GB, GR, PT, FI, CY, CZ, EE, LV) - and they indeed exhibit rather low identifi-
cation and support shares in the rational dimension (see ch. 5.1). These countries can be split 
up in two groups (cf. Delhey 2005). On the one hand, some citizens are labelled as ‘voluntary’ 
outsiders (e.g. in GB, FI) who emotionally dissociate from the European community; on the 
other hand, there seem to be ‘forced’ outsiders (e.g. in GR, PT) whose citizens might not feel 
accepted in the ‘club’ of Europe - especially after the consequences of financial and state cri-
sis.  Admittedly, these are speculative explanations that are in need of further qualitative in-
vestigation123.  
According to hypothesis H3, we expect ‘old’ members to show a relatively high share of ‘EU-
Enthusiasts’ in the emotional dimension. Four out of six ‘core’ countries fulfil this hypothesis 
(FR, BE, DE-W124, LU; exception: NL, IT) which slightly supports H3. But the ‘newest’ 
members’ citizens (LV, MT, PL, SK. BG, RO) also feature extremely high shares of ‘EU-
Enthusiasts’. This is quite surprising with regard to the short socialisation period. The citizens’ 
‘hopeful’ anticipations towards the European community are a possible explanation. 
 
  
                                                 
123 This is due to the fact that citizens are assigned to one ideal-type on base of their respond behaviour - but 
actually various causalities might be the reason for the responds. This points to required refinement of this 
questionnaire items. 
124 DE-W almost reached the upper tertile. 
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Table 8: Emotional dimension’s relative shares of ideal typical EU-attitude by country 
 
Source: own presentation 
 
 
Suggestions for case analyses 
With respect to the relative comparison of ideal type shares, most countries feature heteroge-
neous patterns in the two dimensions125. Three ad hoc interpretations serve as starting points 
                                                 
125 Only LU, GR, SW, EE, MT, and SK feature quite homogenous patterns. 
EU-Enthusiasts EU-Alienated EU-Out-group EU-Opponents / Non-affected
FR - France 44,3% 13,9% 22,8% 19,0%
BE - Belgium 44,3% 13,9% 22,8% 19,0%
NL - The Netherlands 22,4% 15,4% 30,1% 32,1%
DE-W - Germany West 43,0% 14,7% 22,4% 19,9%
IT - Italy 37,1% 10,0% 28,9% 24,1%
LU - Luxembourg 58,0% 15,2% 17,7% 9,2%
DK - Denmark 27,8% 16,0% 30,4% 25,7%
IE - Ireland 37,8% 9,1% 34,4% 18,8%
GB - UNITED KINGDOM 22,2% 6,7% 42,1% 29,0%
GR - Greece 34,1% 2,7% 42,0% 21,2%
ES -Spain 43,8% 7,8% 34,8% 13,6%
PT - Portugal 39,2% 7,8% 37,5% 15,5%
DE-E - Germany East 32,9% 10,5% 30,3% 26,3%
FI - Finland 27,6% 5,2% 50,7% 16,6%
SE - Sweden 26,1% 14,2% 29,5% 30,3%
AT - Austria 35,2% 6,7% 32,8% 25,2%
CY - Cyprus (Republic) 33,3% 1,9% 52,8% 12,1%
CZ - Czech Republic 32,1% 6,9% 36,9% 24,1%
EE - Estonia 38,6% 8,0% 37,5% 15,9%
HU - Hungary 34,5% 13,1% 31,2% 21,2%
LV - Latvia 47,7% 9,2% 27,8% 15,3%
LT - Lithuania 33,5% 4,3% 46,4% 15,9%
MT - Malta 47,3% 8,6% 27,1% 17,0%
PL - Poland 61,5% 7,5% 21,2% 9,7%
SK - Slovakia 44,2% 6,8% 34,7% 14,3%
SI - Slovenia 37,0% 8,4% 31,1% 23,5%
BG - Bulgaria 52,8% 5,6% 28,8% 12,8%
RO - Romania 45,1% 12,0% 32,2% 10,7%
Emotional dimension
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of analysis and require further investigation. 
Germany-West is a case in point for ‘core’ countries (cf. FR, BE, LU): its citizens are very 
enthusiastic in the economic-political sphere, but the socio-cultural sphere, the ideal type 
‘EU-Alienation’ is relatively strong. The citizens cherish the EU within the rational framing; 
they are also emotionally attached to the EU – but they dissociate from the European commu-
nity. This typical pattern exhibited by the ‘core’ countries might be due to the perception that 
the European community becomes more and more heterogeneous - and the ‘original value-
core’ gets lost. 
Bulgaria is the typical representative of a ‘new’ member state exhibiting a pragmatic stance in 
the economic-political sphere and many ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the socio-cultural one. This un-
expected combination raises questions about the explanatory approaches - but also on the Eu-
robarometer’s retrieval method. Supposing the answers are valid and comparable with other 
countries, the main question is why Bulgarians do not feel like EU citizens while emotional 
attachment and diffuse support are high. This case is meaningful with regard to ‘identity poli-
cy’126 (see ch. 6.1).  
Greece is another interesting case: its citizens feature a larger number of ‘EU-Pragmatics’ in 
the rational dimension and a high share of the ideal type ‘EU-Out-group’ in the emotional 
one. This means that Greek citizens support EU-politics and perceive European homogeneity 
- but they neither feel like a civic citizen of the EU nor are they emotionally attached. Support 
of the EU rests on unsteady foundations. This combination is ‘risky’ with regard to long-term 
EU-commitment: as soon as Greeks do not see any advantage of membership, they might 
quickly turn into the ideal type ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’127.  
 
5.4 Overall results and country clustering 
 
Summing up, the results scarcely affirm the deducted hypotheses. The unidimensional hy-
potheses do not live up to the topic’s complex causalities. Each country case stands for itself 
with unique causalities, institutional background, narratives, value orientation, character of 
national identity, public discourses etc. Nevertheless, the presented findings hopefully repre-
sent a starting point for further examination. 
 
                                                 
126 Directorate-General for Research & Innovation (2012, p 4); Karolewski (2011)  
127 Analyses of longitudinal and time-series data during the crises might reveal meaningful results. 
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Conclusion of hypotheses  
• Hypothesis H1 claims that ‘old’ members show a relatively high share of the 
ideal type ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’/’EU-Alienated’. This hypothesis is only sup-
ported in the emotional dimension, whereas the rational dimension shows con-
tradicting findings.   
• Hypothesis H2 predicts that ‘new’ members show a relatively high share of the 
ideal type ‘EU-Pragmatics’/’EU-Out-group’. The findings are also ambiguous 
and show the same pattern as the first hypothesis: H2 is not affirmed in the ra-
tional dimension but partly supported in the emotional one. There might be two 
qualities of the ‘EU-Out-group’: those citizens who can be labelled as ‘volun-
tary’ outsiders and those who feel as ‘forced’ outsiders (explanation see ch. 5.3). 
• Hypothesis H3 predicts a higher share of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the emotional di-
mension than in the rational one among ‘old’ members. This prediction is not 
supported. Surprisingly, the ‘newest’ members show relatively high shares of 
‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the emotional dimension. 
• Hypothesis H4 indicates a higher share of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in the rational di-
mension than in the emotional one among ‘new’ members. The hypothesis is not 
supported. Nevertheless, there is a picture of ambivalence that the ‘newest’ 
members and ‘core’ countries show relatively high shares of ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ in 
the rational dimension which points to two different explanations. 
 
Taken together, the hypotheses H1 and H2 are supported in the emotional dimension: ’old’ 
members are prone to show relatively many citizens of the type ‘EU-Alienated’ and ‘new’ 
members of the type ‘EU-Out-group’. The remaining hypotheses cannot be verified or even 
show contradicting results.  These findings question the common assumption that ‘old’ EU 
member states show a strong emotional identification. In particular, the citizens of ‘core’ 
countries often show a surprisingly pragmatic EU-attitude in the rational dimension. This 
leads to another unexpected finding that many citizens of ‘new’ member states are more emo-
tionally attached to the EU than literature predicts. This result indicates that ‘duration of 
membership’ is only one factor amongst many. Alternative explanations are discussed in chap-
ter 5.5. 
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Overall results 
Beyond these concrete findings, the following points present the main results of this study: 
• EU-identification and EU-support vary enormously among countries and are not as 
closely linked as literature predicts. 
• Depending on the country, the strength of relationship between EU-identification and 
EU-support varies.  
• The four ideal types’ shares vary strongly among countries. 
• Depending on the predefined EU-framing, the ideal type shares differ enormously 
within most countries. This means that the given EU-framing has an impact on EU-
attitude. Since several elements are part of the rational and emotional dimension (see 
4.2.2) the single element’s impact remains unclear. 
• Analyses on single country cases might reveal crucial insights (cf. ch. 5.2 and 5.3). 
• The hypotheses are mostly falsified or only carefully affirmed. The unidimensional 
dependent variable ‘duration of membership’ does not live up to the problem’s com-
plexity. The most important points are: 
o The ‘core’ countries’ and very ‘new’ members’ citizens identify an astonish-
ingly amount with the EU. 
o Surprisingly, not the ‘new’ but the ‘core’ countries’ citizens show a pragmatic 
stance towards the EU. 
o The ‘newest’ members are unexpectedly enthusiastic in the emotional dimen-
sion. 
o ‘Core’ countries’ citizens feel alienated from the European community. They 
possibly see themselves as ‘value-core’ but regard the heterogeneous European 
community as culturally overstrained by horizontal enlargement. 
o In contrast, many ‘new’ members see what Europeans have in common but 
they do not feel attached to this community. I suggest two internal groups: the 
first group of ‘outsiders’ might react to the ‘core’ countries’ rejection of hori-
zontal enlargement and perceive themselves as unwanted ‘forced outsiders’; 
the second group are ‘voluntary’ outsiders whose strong national identity and 
geographical distance might hamper emotional attachment.  
• Several limitations are identified in the course of the research. Among others, the 
measurement of latent structures and validity of operationalisation are questionable 
and call for refinement.  
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Clustering 
Although an individual country approach is promoted by this study, a country clustering shall 
facilitate systematisation of EU-attitude among countries. Limitations accompany this at-
tempt: the clustering’s fundament are this study’s operationalisations of EU-attitude. Their 
validity has not yet been tested. Furthermore, the two applied dimensions of EU-framing are a 
suggestion and can be designed in various ways128.  
In contrast to previous clustering attempts, geographical closeness is not applied. A crucial 
criterion of clustering is the duration of EU-membership which accounts for this work’s as-
sumed major independent variable. This clustering is a preliminary suggestion based on pre-
sented results of ideal typical EU-attitude, a quantitative hierarchical clustering129, and al-
ready conducted qualitative clustering attempts (e.g. Haller 2009, pp 301 ff.). In order not to 
oversimplify the results, eight clusters are presented: 
 
1. ‘Core’ Enthusiasts and Cultural Alienation (FR, BE, DE-W, LU, ES) 
2. ‘New’ Enthusiasts (MT, PL, SK, BG, RO) 
3. ‘Old’ Opponents (NL, DK, IT, DE-E) 
4. ‘New’ Opponents (CZ, AT) 
5. Pragmatic Outsiders (EE, GR, PT)  
6. Political Supporters and Cultural Outsiders (FI, SL, IE)  
7. Political Opponents and Cultural Outsiders (GB, LT, CY)  
8. Political Opponents and Cultural Alienation (SW, HU)  
 
Notable is that both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Europeans are split in two main clusters each. 
Thus, ‘core’ and ‘new’ Enthusiasts seem very close (cluster 1 and 2), as well as ‘old’ and 
‘new’ Opponents (cluster 3 and 4).  
The other clusters show a pragmatic stance (cluster 5) or a ‘mixed’ EU-attitude with respect to 
EU-framing (clusters 6, 7, and 8). These ‘mixed’ clusters might be meaningful to understand 
their relevance for EU-framing within national contexts and the causal relationship between 
EU-identification and EU-support. Another crucial point is that the clusters 5-8 imply particu-
lar risks and potentials with regard to identity policy (see ch. 6.2).  
                                                 
128 There are additional societal spheres which are worth examination. In preliminary analyses of this work, a 
political (referring to democracy, corruption, and human rights) and a global (referring to world politics) sphere 
were added leading to meaningful results. Due to the restricted extent of this work they are not presented. 
129 See appendix for dendrograms, methods, and measures. The clusters are calculated as hierarchical cluster 
analysis using the shares of the four ideal types of both dimensions.  
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5.5 Evaluation of explanatory variables 
 
The three explanatory approaches ‘national value orientation’, ‘political opportunity-cost 
model’ and ‘national identity type’ are briefly evaluated in this chapter. The evaluation is 
based on descriptive findings published by other scholars and this work’s presented results. 
The analysed figures refer to the macro level and imply the risk of economic fallacy. Bearing 
this shortcoming in mind, this chapter serves as a starting point for further analyses on micro 
level. 
 
National value orientation 
According to chapter 3.3.1, post-materialist values facilitate identification with the EU and its 
community. Thus, a post-materialist orientation leads to a relatively high share of sceptical 
‘EU-Idealists’ and ‘EU-Enthusiasts’. Materialist values lead to a higher share of ‘EU-
Pragmatics’ and ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’.  
In order to confirm this link, Inglehart’s ‘Cultural Map of the World’ is applied. It depicts 
post-materialism by the two dimensions ‘self-expression’ and ‘secular rational’ values (Ingle-
hart & Welzel 2010, p 554). Generally, Scandinavian countries (besides FI) show strong, the 
geographical ‘core’ and ‘Southern’ countries intermediate, and most ‘Eastern’ members weak 
post-materialist value orientation130.  
Consequently, Scandinavians are expected to be ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ or ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ - 
but most citizens are ‘EU-Opponents’131. ‘Eastern’ countries are expected to feature a prag-
matic or opponent stance towards the EU - but the opposite is often the case. ‘Core’ and 
‘Southern’ countries do not reveal clear patterns.  
Summing up, this explanatory variable is not supported. Either value orientations are too ab-
stract to form concrete attitude formation or post-materialism is just not the decisive value 
orientation. In preliminary analyses of this work, several values have been tested without 
promising result. The future of this approach is indeed compelling but the presented results 
are underwhelming. 
 
Political opportunity cost model  
According to chapter 3.3.2, individuals do not usually relate themselves directly with the EU 
but use their nation-state as a proxy. The political opportunity cost model predicts that the 
                                                 
130 PL, IE, and PT show very strong traditional values. MT is not included. 
131 Exception is FI that shows intermediate post-materialist values and intermediate ideal-type shares. 
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evaluation of the nation-state is negatively related to the evaluation of the EU. This explana-
tion primarily targets the support item of the rational dimension and its political institutions. 
Thus, countries whose citizens value their national system highly are expected to show rela-
tively high shares of ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ and ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’.  
In order to review this link, figures on the evaluation of national governance quality are used 
(Christin 2008, p 62). A positive evaluation of the national political system is found in Scan-
dinavian and some ‘core’ countries. These citizens tentatively feature the expected low EU-
support132. Also, some of the ‘new’ countries’ citizens show the expected opposite pattern133: 
they are less satisfied with governance quality and feature high EU-support.  
The evaluation of this explanatory variable is rather affirmative but it is qualified by many 
exceptions and it targets primarily specific support. However, the political opportunity cost 
model seems promising for further investigation.  
 
National identity type 
The dualistic concept of national identity introduced in chapter 3.3.3 distinguishes between 
civic and ethnic national identity. In contrast to the civic identity type, the ethnic one does not 
allow multiple identities and consequently hampers EU-identification134. This explanatory 
approach aims at the identification item of the emotional dimension. Hence, a prevailing eth-
nic identity type leads to higher shares of ‘EU-Outsiders’ and ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-
affected’. An indicator for a strong ethnic identity is the item ‘pride to be a member of [na-
tion]’ (Haller 2009, p 306)135.  
Indeed, countries with strong ethnic identity show relatively high shares of ‘EU-Outsiders’ 
and ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’. However, several exceptions are found136. The re-
sults nevertheless point to a promising explanatory variable.  
 
6 Discussion 
 
The following paragraphs discuss this study’s findings in consideration of further research 
(ch. 6.1) and political implications (ch. 6.2). The last chapter lets us look beyond the actual 
results and gives prospects for the future of the European project. 
                                                 
132 NL, AT, GB, DK, FI, SE (LU contradicts thesis) 
133 RO , PL, LV,  BG, TR (LT, LV, HU, IT, SK, CZ contradict thesis) 
134 e.g. Habermas 2001, pp 15 f.; Cerutti & Lucarelli 2008, p 61; Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 125 
135 Unfortunately, the figures of seven member states are missing and the shares for NL are from another survey. 
136 PL, HU, IE 
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6.1 Further research  
 
It has proved difficult to live up to the reader’s expectations: most hypotheses are rejected and 
none of the explanatory variables show convincing results. It seems that even more questions 
have arisen than have been solved. The benefit of these upcoming questions is their potential 
for further investigation. 
First of all, general limitations of this research realm (described in ch. 1.3. and 5) affect future 
studies. Restricted datasets and the problem of culturally/linguistically biased understanding 
of questionnaire items are severe issues. Another crucial result is the rejection of the geo-
graphic split-up: the prejudice of pragmatic ‘Eastern’ and idealistic ‘Western’ countries seems 
far too simple. This is affirmed by the finding that i) ‘core’ and ‘new’ ‘EU-Enthusiasts’ as well 
as ii) ‘old’ and ‘new’ ‘EU-Opponents’ are very close - and the remaining four clusters do not 
show any geographic proximity. Also, duration of membership is not the decisive explanatory 
factor. This calls for a change of mind with regard to ‘East-West’ and ‘old-new’ prejudices in 
this scientific field. 
With regard to this work’s research design, the dualistic dimensions of the political-economic 
and socio-cultural sphere are open for further development. Preliminary analyses have 
included two additional promising societal realms which reflect a civic and a global security 
sphere137 (cf. Donig, Meyer & Winkler 2005, p 139).  
When discussing explanatory factors on macro level, the risk of economic fallacy is implied. 
Due to its limited extent, this work cannot incorporate auspicious individual variables138. In 
particular, the role of ethnic national identity seems fruitful. Further research should conduct 
multilevel regressions including the micro level to reveal causalities and moderating effects. 
This recommendation contains a crucial limitation: the impact of single institutional factors139 
is indeed interesting but the interpretation of multilevel regressions with several ‘moderated’ 
factors is statistically too complex. Therefore, the potential of Qualitative Comparative Analy-
sis (QCA) is promising. This method matches the requirements of this research field by taking 
path-dependent decisions, critical junctures, historical formation of interest groups, the histo-
ry of civil society, and the role of public media140 into account (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 
                                                 
137 Although these results revealed interesting insights, they are left out for reasons of clarity and 
comprehensibility. 
138 for instance, ‘professional background’ and ‘personal experience with Europeans’ (Bücker 2012, p 77) 
139 such as EU-membership in years, modernisation index (HDI), social inequality (GINI), the strength of civil 
society (Civil Society Index  and Global Civil Society Index ), migrant politics (Mipex), and welfare regime 
types 
140 Also, analysis on the emergence of mass opinion is promising (see ch. 6.2). The complexity of this issue is 
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382). Also, qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews are relevant to understand the 
basic concepts of this sensitive research field141. 
Another shortcoming is the low chance of affective retrieval by standard questionnaires such 
as the Eurobarometer. A method of psychological studies is to measure the response speed: the 
quicker the answers come, the stronger is the mode of affective reasoning142. Unfortunately, 
these psychological methods have not yet been taken into account in this research field - 
although there are several relevant concepts143.  
 
“[C]ontingent, multi-causal frameworks” are needed in order to elaborate “nu-
anced, cross-disciplinary inquiries and arguments that more closely approximate 
the multiple worlds Europeans experience on a daily basis” (emphasis added)144.  
 
6.2 Political implications  
 
The argument of normative over-tones should be anticipated beforehand: this chapter regards 
the EU as a collective actor whose objective is to strengthen ‘European identity’ in order to 
build up legitimacy (cf. Easton 1965). According to the publications of the Directorate-
General for Research & Innovation145, this chapter assumes that the EU aims to implement a 
stable EU-commitment. 
The results show that EU-attitude and EU-framing diverge among individuals - and nations 
(Kriesi 1999, pp 272 ff.). Thus, the question arises, what kind of ‘identity policy’ is the ‘right’ 
one in a given country? Although there is no official term for the EU’s identity policy, there 
are official efforts by the European Commission to implement a European identity (Direc-
torate-General for Research & Innovation 2012, p 4). I label these efforts ‘EU identity policy’ 
in the following.  
This work’s ‘mapping’ of EU-attitude might reveal helpful insights to decide on the strategy 
of identity promotion. According to the institutionalist perspective, the EU is - besides nation-
                                                                                                                                                        
shown in Fuchs’ model: he includes the system level (political system, media), and the individual level 
(reception of media messages, its acceptance or rejection based on political predispositions), and the retrieval by 
survey questions that show the “official” mass opinion on identity and support (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 
44). 
141 Rautenfeld (2011) 
142 Studies affirm that these answers are more stable over time and better predictors for behaviour (Sudman, 
Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 127 f.). 
143 Such as ‘contrast-effects’ and ‘subject-object relations’ (Lucarelli 2011; Gigerenzer & Selten 2001; Sudman, 
Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 105, 126 f., 131). 
144 Checkel & Katzenstein (2009, p 227) 
145 Directorate-General for Research & Innovation 2012 
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states - regarded as main actor of top-down identity formation and ‘trans-nation-building pro-
cesses’. Therefore, the following general implications are suggested in order to strengthen 
EU-commitment.  
- The aim to improve legitimisation of the EU and solidarity among European citizens 
seems to be urgent with regard to current crises and debates on a widened policy 
scope. Therefore, civic identification shall have priority in identity policy at first: a 
‘healthy’ civic identification is the first step to raise this kind of political support146. 
An advantage of civic identification is that it seems less affected by strong ethnic iden-
tities147. Another upside is that civic identification can change within a rather short 
time by the ‘direct route’ of cognitive reasoning (cf. ch. 3.3.2). Promising political in-
struments are the citizens’ civic integration by intensified democratic procedures and 
the improvement of the EU’s transparency.  
- Changeability of civic identification is however likewise both an asset and a draw-
back: the presented identification process can be diminished rather easily. In contrast, 
affectual identification could be the long-lasting ‘adhesive’ that withstands critical 
junctures. Building up this kind of affectual identification requires much more time 
than the civic one (see ch. 3.3.2). Bruter claims that it is important to “give a face to 
Europe” (emphasis added) – for example politicians with whom citizens can identify 
(Bruter 2006, p 91).  
- Intensified interaction across borders also strengthens horizontal and vertical commu-
nication. Likewise, this concerns the links between citizens, EU-institutions, and na-
tional actors of the political/economic/social realm. 
- A common public sphere strengthens the visibility of European issues in the citizen’s 
daily life. To date, the public sphere usually remains ‘national’ due to language barri-
ers and path-dependency.  
The critical question is which actor has the legitimacy to build up this ‘European’ me-
dia. The European Commission might use this platform as a political tool. Civil society 
seems the more appropriate actor - particularly with regard to constructivist potential: 
once established, a ‘European coffeehouse’ might reinvent itself by a mutual and rein-
forcing process.  
- Another chance – and risk - is the on-going state crises as a critical juncture. At the 
                                                 
146 Although this work highlights the independence of EU-identification and EU-support, the concepts’ mutual 
interplay is crucial for these deliberations (see results in ch. 5.1).  
147 Köngeter (2013) 
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moment, the crossroad seems to split in two: either solidarity or autonomy among the 
member states is perceived as a solution. Considering the current political develop-
ments - especially the financial support of ‘failed’ member states – the political deci-
sions of the EU have not created cohesion but reactance among most politicians and 
citizens. Nevertheless, there is the chance that the common narrative of the crises 
leads to cohesion in future148.  
 
Risks and potential of ideal typical EU-attitudes 
‘Risky’ and ‘potential’ patterns of the countries’ EU-attitudes are reflected by the two ‘mixed’ 
ideal types ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ and ‘EU-Pragmatics’149. The crucial idea is that EU-
support is more likely to change. Consequently, ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’ feature a higher prob-
ability to become ‘EU-Enthusiasts’. ‘EU-Pragmatics’ are more likely to turn into ‘EU-
Opponents’.  
Depending on these two ideal types, specific strategies of EU identity policy are recommend-
able. Due to this research design’s institutionalist foundation, strategies on country level are 
highlighted. For reasons of clarity, the footnotes name the countries in question.  
- To make use of the described potential of ‘sceptical EU-Idealists’, ideas on instru-
ments are introduced by dimension in the following. Countries with a relatively high 
share of this ideal type are very heterogeneous in the rational dimension150. In the 
emotional one, many ‘core’ countries are found151. 
In the rational dimension, EU-support can be strengthened by democratic decision-
making, more transparency, and information on the EU and its policy. The emotional 
dimensions’ ideal type ‘EU-Alienated’ is more difficult to turn into ‘EU-
Enthusiasts’152. In order to convince these citizens that the European community is 
worth solid support and solidarity, affective and emotion-based attitudes need to 
change. The key might be personal experiences: interaction and communication 
among Europeans fosters this affectual and entrenched kind of EU-support. Instru-
ments are, for example, exchange programs that involve not only the elite but the 
whole society. 
                                                 
148 Also, the psychological concept of ‘effort justification’ explains how the crises foster solidary commitment 
(Festinger 1985, c1957). 
149 Of course, the shares of the ideal type ‘EU-Opponents’/’Non-affected’ indicate severe risks considering 
European cohesion and solidarity. With regard to identity policy, this population needs particular notice. 
150 DK, GB, ES, SE, CY, CZ, LV, LT, PL 
151 FR, BE, DE-W, LU, DK, SE, HU, RO 
152 The feeling of being part of a community is rather a bottom-up phenomenon. Thus, it can hardly be initiated 
by top-down initiatives of political entities. 
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- In contrast, ‘EU-Pragmatics’ bear the risk of easily becoming ‘EU-Opponents’. This 
ideal type’s support rests on unsteady foundations. These citizens could quickly turn 
into ‘EU-Opponents’/’EU-Non-affected’ as soon as no advantage of membership is 
perceived153. It seems crucial that exactly this ‘risky’ ideal-type requires intense identi-
ty-policy154.  
In order to strengthen civic identification in the rational dimension, democratisation 
processes might, again, be helpful to involve individuals as part of political decision-
making. Also, ‘giving a face to Europe’ might improve this kind of identification. The 
implementation of affective identification in the emotional dimension is surely more 
problematic. These psychological processes are complex and based on heuristic 
shortcuts and feelings155. Therefore, long-term socialisation processes are crucial. 
Suggested approaches are the visibility of European symbols in daily life and the 
(common) public sphere.  
 
One finding implies meaningful potential for current identity policy: the strong emotional 
attachment of ‘fresh’ member states’ citizens. This early stage of membership might offer a 
crucial starting point to implement long term commitment.  
 
The consideration of a country’s predominant ideal-typical EU-attitude and its 
particular institutional background are crucial for the development of adjusted EU 
identity policy. 
 
6.3 Outlook 
 
In the case of the abstract construct of European identity, the question on ‘real’ phenomena 
appears particularly nebulous156. Checkel and Katzenstein describe this circumstance by 
painting a bleak picture that the “ship of European identity entered unchartered waters”. On 
the ship, navigation is problematic and the crew is “grumbling” while uncertainty and anxiety 
“define the moment” (Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, p 1). Manifold visions of the journey’s 
                                                 
153 In the case of GR it might be meaningful to analyse longitudinal or time-series data during the crises. 
154 Many ‘old’ members feature high shares of EU-Pragmatics in the rational framing (BE, NL, IT, IE, GR). 
Also, the three ‘newest’ EU-members SL, BG, and RO show the same pattern. 
155 The EU’s identity policy needs to consider specific strategies that focus on the perception of ‘other’ 
Europeans. As a case in point, ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ outsiders require different ‘kinds’ of promotion. 
156 This work does not engage in the philosophical debate on detection of ‘reality’. 
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destination seem to hamper the crew’s cooperation.   
Averting the gaze from this metaphor and turning to the actual European member states, a 
sobering thought arises: the EU’s heterogeneity will always feature “discriminating particular-
isms” among countries due to inherent power inequalities. Hence, Europe “will never end up 
in a coherent narrative” (Rautenfeld 2011, p 237)157. The logic derivation is that there is no 
chance that a homogenous European identity will emerge158.  
But do we actually need a common European identity? As mentioned in the introduction, Eu-
rope is neither a ‘melting pot’ nor a ‘salad bowl’ but a mosaic – the question is what adhesive 
forces keep it together (Lehmann 2012). Political actors, civil society, and scientists have not 
yet found this connecting ‘adhesive’. Nevertheless, I claim that mutual communication is a 
promising candidate for this ‘adhesive’ because social contact across borders can create trust 
among Europeans159. Possible contact occasions that reinforce this process are manifold and 
become more and more part of daily life - be it by common media160, business trips, Erasmus 
exchange programs, bank transfers - or on Facebook.  
Despite this work’s ‘top-down’ approach, the presented political implications are not meant as 
an instruction for how to ‘create’ EU-citizens ‘à la carte’. In contrast, the importance of ‘bot-
tom-up’ processes shall be highlighted: the actions of civil society161 will possibly work as the 
crucial ‘engine’ of EU-identification (Heinrich & Fioramonti 2008, pp 310 ff.). Civil society 
promotes - consciously and unconsciously - European identity through various actions. For 
instance, active citizenship promotes abstract values as social trust. This makes contact to 
members of an out-group more probable and, hence, benefits European cohesion in the long 
run (Maloney 2010, p 130; Forbes 1997, p 9 f.). “European Citizens’ Initiatives”162 are a new 
‘kind’ of action that confronts the EU institutions and the European civil society with their 
own propagated values. I argue that this new form of collective civil action enables a search of 
European identity on individual and institutional level. Also, associations163 engage in Euro-
pean cohesion. These associations mainly target academics and university students. A crucial 
ingredient of the mosaic’s ‘adhesive’ seems to incorporate a broad social group. Hence, these 
                                                 
157 National governments perform so called political “EU-blame-shifting” which manifests national ideas of 
Europe (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 246). 
158 Although this work analyses European identification, the role of European identity is a crucial future issue.  
159 cf. Stürmer (2008, p 283 ff.), Forbes (1997, p 9 f.) 
160 cf. the parasocial contact hypotesis (Schiappa 2005) 
161 There is no common definition of civil society (Anheier 2004, p 6). Thus, a very broad understanding is 
applied which refers to the third sector including all societal spheres that are not assigned to the political or 
economic sector. 
162 e.g. “Water is a Human Right” (Krupa 2013) 
163 e.g. AEGEE – “European student’s forum”, the “European Youth Forum”, and ERYICA – “European Youth 
Information and Counselling Agency” 
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associations shall grasp the opportunity to involve pupils, white-collar workers, and students 
with lower educational status to strengthen social trust in the centre of European society.  
The historical conception of the EU influences enormously the ‘kind ‘of identity. Both the EU 
as political entity and the European community are an experiment: as opposed to most nation-
states, the EU currently resembles a political “Staatsnation” – and the “Kulturnation” might 
not have yet established (Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, p 208). But although the conception of 
a European “Staatsnation” is prevailing at the moment, it is unclear whether the respective 
European ‘demos’ exists.   
To date, it remains vague as to what the endpoint of Europeanisation is and who the actors in 
charge are. However, the EU’s growing range of competences increase its relevance to citi-
zens and, consequently, the degree of required societal support. This will lead to a time-
consuming collective decision process concerning the ‘route’ of Europeanisation.   
The Federal President of Germany, Joachim Gauck, recently gave a speech on the prospects 
for the European idea164. Indeed, he senses Europe’s demographical, economic, and cultural 
heterogeneity – but he spots the chance to “mak[e] diversity more genuinely part of our lives 
and allowing it to unite us” by a “European identity [that] grows out of our deepening coop-
eration”. Maybe he glimpsed a bit of the ‘adhesive’ that supports the European ‘crew’ to 
agree on a common destination. 
                                                 
164 Gauck (22.02.13) 
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